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Personal Delegations 
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz† 
INTRODUCTION 
Donald and Gloria Luster married on October 5, 1963 and 
had four children.1 Donald retired in 2005, and it was about this 
time when Jeannine Childree, his youngest daughter and a 
registered nurse, noticed that he was exhibiting signs of dementia.2 
After a number of consultations with doctors, Donald was officially 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 2009 due to his memory loss, 
disorientation, and other cognitive impairments.3 Based on these 
medical evaluations, a Connecticut probate court declared Donald 
incapable of handling his personal or financial affairs and 
appointed Jeannine and his other daughter, Jennifer Dearborn, as 
his guardians.4 Shortly thereafter, Gloria filed for a legal separation 
from Donald, and in response, the daughters counterclaimed for 
divorce, suspecting their mother of financial and emotional 
abuse.5 Should the guardian-daughters have the authority to 
sue for divorce on behalf of their father?6 
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 1 See Luster v. Luster, No. FA094010779S, 2011 LEXIS 1844, at *3-4 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 20, 2011). 
 2 See id. at *6-7. 
 3 See id. at *8, *10. 
 4 See id. at *11. 
 5 See id. at *1. There was in fact evidence that Gloria had dissipated marital 
assets, using a durable power of attorney that may have been signed after Donald lost 
capacity. See id. at *11-17. There was also some evidence of emotional abuse. See id. at 
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In 2000, Joe Thomas Garrett died after a bout with lung 
cancer.7 About a week before he died, he signed a durable 
power of attorney and approved a will.8 The power of attorney 
designated Joe’s brother, Larry, as attorney-in-fact, and the 
will poured Joe’s assets into a trust bearing Joe’s name.9 Its 
trustees were Carolynne (Joe’s wife), and Larry, and its assets 
would be distributed at Caroylnne’s death, with only two 
percent going to one of Joe’s daughters, Joni Hart.10 Although 
Joni had only seen her father a handful of times since 1969, she 
challenged the will on several grounds, including that Joe 
lacked the mental capacity to execute it and that it was invalid 
because it was actually executed by Larry.11 Assuming Joe 
lacked decisional capacity, should Larry have the authority to 
execute a will on his brother’s behalf?12 
These types of questions are more familiar in the 
health-care context, where the legal system has publicly 
grappled with the difficulties of delegating the decision to 
  
*9 (“The defendant [Donald] reported that the plaintiff would ask him ‘why are you still 
alive[.]’”); id. at *9 (“The defendant was extremely frightened of the plaintiff [Gloria] 
and felt unsafe in his own home.”).  
 6 Gloria moved to dismiss the daughters’ counterclaim, contending that 
guardians’ powers are limited and that allowing guardians the power to divorce would 
allow them to “bring dissolution of another’s marriage for a myriad of reasons including 
financial gain or personal animosity.” See Luster v. Luster, 17 A.3d 1068, 1075 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2011). Judge Klaczak of the superior court agreed, noting that the majority 
rule prohibited guardians from filing for divorce for their wards, as this was an 
“intensely personal” decision and that there was an “inherent inability to know” what 
Donald would have wanted in this situation. See Luster, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 63, 
at *1-2. The appeals court reversed, focusing on the need for the representation of 
Donald’s interests in court and the problem of leaving potentially abusive situations 
unaddressed. See Luster, 17 A.3d at 1077-78. Gloria appealed, and the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut granted certiorari on the question, but later dismissed the case for 
failure to file a brief. See Luster v. Luster, 23 A.3d 1243 (Conn. 2011); Luster v. Luster, 
SC 18820 (Conn. Apr. 13, 2012) (mem. dismissal). For a summary of the law in other 
states, see infra Part I.B.3. 
 7 See In re Estate of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 73-74 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). 
 8 See id. at 74. 
 9 Id. at 73-74. 
 10 See id. 
 11 Id. at 74-76. 
 12 The court’s answer was no. See id. at 76 (“Under a power of attorney, an 
agent is authorized to act with respect to any and all matters on behalf of the principal 
with the exception of those which, by their nature, by public policy, or by contract require 
personal performance. The decision of who, what, when, and how one’s property is to be 
distributed upon death is clearly personal and that of the principal alone, and thus falls 
within the exception.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The court, 
however, found that the will was validly executed by Joe himself and upheld it. See id. 
(“Larry merely acted as a conduit or messenger between the decedent and Neihouse 
[the attorney] concerning the decedent’s wishes because the decedent was ill and 
unable to leave the hospital.”). 
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withdraw life-sustaining treatment from individuals such as 
Karen Ann Quinlan,13 Nancy Cruzan,14 and Terri Schiavo.15 
Cases like these illustrate the important question of proxy 
decision-making on personal matters, yet courts and legislatures 
are divided on whether and how to delegate personal decision-
making authority for individuals who suffer from cognitive 
impairment. Nevertheless, this question’s importance in the 
United States is unlikely to subside anytime soon. Millions of 
people lack decisional capacity due to illness or accident, and 
these numbers will only increase with an aging population.16 
Further, the traditional lines of decision-making authority have 
broken down as family and caregiving structures have changed.17 
Thus, society will face more and more scenarios in which people 
with cognitive impairments may require support or a proxy in 
making crucial life decisions. While this reality presents many 
difficult questions, it also creates an opportunity to rethink and 
reevaluate how the law treats people with cognitive 
impairments.18 
The central claim of this article is that in the case of 
decisional incapacity, decisions that implicate fundamental 
human capabilities should generally be delegable. Thus, it 
rejects the rationale employed by courts to justify 
nondelegation—that these types of decisions are too personal to 
be made by another. This line of reasoning confuses 
nondelegation for nondecision, and it only serves to privilege a 
status quo outcome over the expression of fundamental human 
capabilities by individuals with cognitive impairments. The 
primary normative framework that guides the analysis is the 
  
 13 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 14 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 15 See In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 16 See Liesi E. Hebert et al., Alzheimer Disease in the US Population: 
Prevalence Estimates Using the 2000 Census, 60 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1119, 1120 
(2003) (estimating there are 4.5 million people in the United States with Alzheimer’s 
disease and projecting that this number will increase to 13.2 million by 2050). 
 17 See ELAINE M. BRODY, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT CARE YEARS 7-
22 (2d ed. 2004) (describing changing family structures); David T. Ellwood & Christopher 
Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States Since 1960, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 30-37, 49-52 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (same). 
 18 These issues are not unique to the United States. Other countries also 
grapple with how to treat certain types of decisions in the case of decisional incapacity. 
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH BGB (CIVIL CODE) §§ 1903-07 (delineating delegation 
or nondelegation of authority for decisions about marriage, willmaking, sterilization, 
and residence for those under custodianship in Germany). 
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capabilities approach.19 It posits that capabilities, or the 
freedoms or opportunities to achieve certain core functionings, 
are the relevant metric for social justice. Access to the 
capabilities that we consider fundamental to the human 
experience, such as the capability to live a life that is not 
arbitrarily cut short or the capability to have social affiliations, 
must be provided on an adequate basis to all, including those 
with cognitive impairment. Thus, most individuals who lack 
decisional capacity should be free to exercise their fundamental 
capabilities through, or with the assistance of, a surrogate. One 
need not adhere to the capabilities approach, however, to 
support some range of personal delegations. This article also 
explores other normative arguments—including autonomy and 
alternative conceptions of welfare—that might justify different 
types of personal delegation regimes. 
As a practical matter, this means that various personal 
decisions, such as those involving divorce, estate planning, or 
health care, should be delegable to surrogates in the event of 
decisional incapacity. This delegation may be achieved either 
through a springing durable power of attorney that specifically 
delegates each of these decisions or through the guardianship 
process. Oversight of attorneys-in-fact should be limited, while 
advance judicial approval should be required for guardians who 
have cognizable conflicts of interest or who are exercising 
decision-making authority in a way that implies a likely conflict 
of interest. However, since the court may lack the institutional 
competence to review many of these personal decisions, its 
review should be deferential. In the end, ensuring equal access 
to such personal decisions through delegation is a crucial form 
of empowerment that promotes the flourishing of those living 
with cognitive impairment.  
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the 
background for understanding the field of personal delegations. 
It reviews the mechanisms of personal delegation and surveys 
the legal treatment of divorce, willmaking, and health care—the 
three areas in which these questions have been most subject to 
legal contestation. Part II argues for a rule that decisions that 
implicate fundamental human capabilities should generally be 
delegable. It then considers other normative arguments derived 
from the traditional legal standards for surrogate decision-
  
 19 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (2011); AMARTYA 
SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). 
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making: substituted judgment and best interests. Part II also 
addresses objections based on the notion that certain decisions 
are too personal to be delegated to another. Part III examines 
how personal delegations would work in practice by discussing 
durable powers of attorney and guardianship, and it then 
briefly reexamines the areas of divorce, wills, and health care. 
I. PERSONAL DELEGATIONS  
Personal delegations are transfers of authority over 
personal decisions to others.20 For the purposes of this article, I 
define personal decisions as those that allow us to exercise our 
fundamental human capabilities in meaningful ways.21 Examples 
include the decisions to marry,22 vote,23 or travel.24 Many of these 
  
 20 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (9th ed. 2009) (defining delegation as 
“[t]he act of entrusting another with authority or empowering another to act as an 
agent or representative”).  
 21 This definition clearly links up with the primary normative theory I 
employ for much of my analysis: the capabilities approach. In Part II.B, I explore 
alternative normative arguments and vary the definition of a personal decision 
accordingly. While there is not a one-to-one match between the different normative 
theories, and thus their definitions, there is at least some overlapping consensus as to 
what would constitute a personal decision. See generally John Rawls, The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987) (applying the concept to 
political justice). 
  I draw on Martha Nussbaum’s work to generate a list of fundamental 
human capabilities. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 72-78 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT]; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69-81 (2006) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS] 
(outlining ten core capabilities—life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
and control over one’s environment (political and material)). While one might disagree 
with elements on her list, the specific decisions analyzed in this article are connected to 
capabilities that most would likely consider fundamental. See infra Part I.B 
(connecting health care, divorce, and testamentary decisions to fundamental 
capabilities that are relatively uncontroversial).  
 22 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (stating that prior cases 
characterize the right to marry as “among the personal decisions protected by the right 
of privacy”). The term privacy, of course, has been strained to encompass a variety of 
different interests that it supposedly protects. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex 
Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the Feminist Critique, in 
INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hasan et 
al. eds., 2002). 
 23 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United 
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”); id. amend. XIX (“The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex.”); id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
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types of decisions receive special protection through various 
constitutional mechanisms.25 This article examines personal 
delegations made in the context of decisional incapacity, or the 
inability to make a specific type of decision entirely on one’s 
own due to cognitive impairment.26 In particular, this article 
focuses on those who once possessed decisional capacity but 
have since lost it, whether due to illness or accident.27 
This part reviews the legal architecture of delegations in 
the event of decisional incapacity. With that basis, it then 
turns to the legal treatment of personal delegations in three 
illustrative areas—divorce, willmaking, and health care.28 
While personal delegations potentially encompass a much 
broader set of decisions, the law is most in flux and thus open 
to contestation and litigation in these areas. In the first two 
domains, personal decisions have historically been 
nondelegable. The rationale for nondelegation is the personal 
nature of the decision, which is analyzed further in Part II. 
  
 24 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (“The constitutional 
right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the 
concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and 
repeatedly recognized.”); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) 
(including among the fundamental rights of citizens the “right of a citizen of one state 
to pass through, or to reside in any other state”). 
 25 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against 
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-72 (2007) (demonstrating how the U.S. 
Constitution actualizes many rights that contribute to various important capabilities). 
 26 See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS 18 
(1990) (“The statement that a particular individual is (or is not) competent is 
incomplete. Competence is always competence for some task—competence to do 
something . . . . [T]he notion of decision-making capacity is itself incomplete until the 
nature of the choice as well as the conditions under which it is to be made are specified. 
Thus competence is decision-relative, not global.”). Because those who currently lack 
capacity could theoretically regain it, the delegations at issue are also revocable. 
 27 This excludes, for the moment, two populations: children and those who 
never possessed decisional capacity. 
 28 Other scholars have examined nondelegation in the areas of wills and 
divorce in isolation, but none have attempted to understand or theorize the field of 
personal delegations as a whole. See, e.g., Mark Schwarz, Note, The Marriage Trap: 
How Guardianship Divorce Bans Abet Spousal Abuse, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 187, 196 
(2011) (discussing lack of delegation in divorce cases); Ralph C. Brashier, Policy, 
Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 63, 102 (2009) (discussing state statutory 
delegation powers over wills); Diane Snow Mills, Comment, “But I Love What’s-His-
Name”: Inherent Dangers in the Changing Role of the Guardian in Divorce Actions on 
Behalf of Incompetents, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 527, 535-36 (2000); Kurt X. 
Metzmeier, Note, The Power of the Incompetent Adult to Petition for Divorce Through a 
Guardian or Next Friend, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 949, 957-58 (1994). 
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A. The Legal Architecture of Delegation 
The three primary legal mechanisms that govern the 
delegation of decisions in the event of decisional incapacity are the 
durable power of attorney, statutory surrogacy, and guardianship.29 
For those who plan in advance, the durable power of attorney 
permits the delegation of decision-making authority past the point 
of incapacity.30 Originally used for delegation of financial decision-
making, its use has now spread beyond the economic realm to the 
health-care arena, as all states now have statutes addressing the 
health-care power of attorney or its equivalent.31 
For those who did not plan in advance, the law provides 
for delegation through statutory surrogacy and guardianship.32 
The former represents the norm in the health-care domain; 
these statutes automatically empower surrogates when there is 
a finding, typically by a physician, that a patient lacks decisional 
capacity. They contain hierarchical lists of potential surrogates, 
starting with the spouse and proceeding to more distant 
familial relations.33 These statutory schemes have an advantage 
  
 29 There are, of course, informal or nonlegal delegations of personal decision-
making authority as well. See Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s 
Impact on the Autonomy of Older Persons, 41 EMORY L. J. 773, 773-78 (1992) (outlining 
the domains in which the family/individual interaction plays out). For example, many 
caregivers for those with cognitive impairments must make proxy decisions about 
various personal activities of daily living, such as bathing, dressing, and eating. See S. 
Katz et al., Studies of Illness in the Aged: The Index of ADL, 185 JAMA 94, 94-99 
(1964) (listing activities of daily living); see also I. Rosow & N. Breslau, A Guttman 
Health Scale for the Aged, 21 J. GERONTOLOGY 556, 556-59 (1966) (describing 
instrumental activities of daily living). Sometimes these decisions are codified as 
delegable in state statutes, but they are so uncontroversial that they almost never 
come up in legal cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2006) (delegating 
decisions about social environment to guardians). The primary allocation mechanisms 
for this type of labor and corresponding personal decision-making authority are gender 
and familial status. While these allocation mechanisms must be interrogated, to do so 
is outside the scope of this article. 
 30 The durable power of attorney is a relatively new phenomenon, having 
been created in the 1950s to remedy the problem that at common law, incapacity of a 
principal extinguished an agency relationship. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as an 
Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 574, 576-78 (1996); see also Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Incompetent Principals, 
Competent Third Parties, and the Law Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115, 119-23 (1986) 
(detailing how courts dealt with the durable power of attorney in the context of 
economic transactions). 
 31 See Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18 
ELDER L.J. 289, 316 (2011). 
 32 See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND 
DECISION MAKING 171-75, 221-25 (2006). 
 33 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1299.58.5 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (West 2008); TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.039 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (2012). These 
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over the guardianship process in that they quickly select a 
decision-maker. A statutory scheme, however, requires an 
institution, legal or nonlegal, to execute it. These statutes have 
been employed in the health-care context primarily because the 
medical profession and health-care institutions exist to serve in 
this role.34 There is typically no judicial oversight of statutory 
surrogates’ decision-making. 
Finally, there is guardianship.35 When someone petitions 
the court to place a person under guardianship, the court holds 
a hearing to determine whether that person truly lacks capacity. 
If so, the court determines what type of guardianship would be 
appropriate given the ward’s decisional and functional 
limitations, and who should serve as guardian.36 Most states 
provide statutory guidelines for the selection of guardians, which 
  
statutes are modeled after the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act or one of its 
predecessor model statutes. The various state statutes’ priority lists do a reasonably 
good job of reflecting patient preferences. See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, 
Designating Health Care Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A 
Psychological Critique, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 1007 (2008). 
 34 See generally Matthew K. Wynia et al., Medical Professionalism in Society, 
341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1612 (1999). 
 35 The state’s authority to do this derives from the doctrine of parens 
patriae—the state’s power to take care of those in society who cannot take care of 
themselves. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) 
(“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’ The parens patriae action has 
its roots in the common-law concept of the ‘royal prerogative.’ The royal prerogative 
included the right or responsibility to take care of persons who ‘are legally unable, on 
account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from 1st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3. 
lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their property.’” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting, among others, J. CHITTY, PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 (1820))). For 
parens patriae’s origins in English common law, see generally Lawrence B. Custer, The 
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). For a critique of 
the doctrine, see George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State 
as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 914-15 (1976) (“Unchecked, however, this 
power will lead to total intrusion by the state into the personal lives of its members.”). 
 36 In Roman law and English common law, the state delegated financial but 
not personal decisions to the guardian of the ward. See Barbara A. Venesy, Comment, 
1990 Guardianship Law Safeguards Personal Rights yet Protects Vulnerable Elderly, 
24 AKRON L. REV. 161, 163 (1990). Modern guardianship law allows guardians to make 
personal as well as financial decisions for a ward, and the court has the option of 
creating one of four types of guardianship: guardianship of the person (granting 
authority over personal decisions), guardianship of the estate (financial decisions), 
plenary guardianship (both types of decisions), and limited guardianship (both types of 
decisions, as tailored to the specific decisional incapacities of the ward). See LAWRENCE 
A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION MAKING 165-81 (2006) 
(explaining the different types of guardianship). The terminology varies by state, with 
some using the term conservator for guardians of the estate or plenary guardians. The 
alternative of limited guardianship has unfortunately not been popular among judges. 
See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited 
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 752 (2002). 
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include a rebuttable list of preferred guardians, similar in 
structure to the lists used to determine statutory surrogates.37 
B. Three Illustrative Areas 
This part examines the three illustrative examples of 
personal delegations law—divorce, willmaking, and health 
care. Each has its own claim to being personal, but delegations 
in these areas are currently treated quite differently, with 
decisions being readily delegable for health care but much more 
controversial for willmaking and divorce. 
1. Divorce 
Marriage is a fundamental social and, more recently, 
legal relation.38 Therefore, the decisions to enter into marriage 
or exit from it through divorce implicate the fundamental 
human capabilities associated with affiliation.39 As social 
beings, we make a variety of choices about who to affiliate with 
(or who to cease affiliating with), and our identities are 
generated in part through these affiliations. The marital 
relation is not the only important type of personal affiliation, 
but it is perhaps the most prominent.  
While the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental 
right to marry,40 it has never explicitly recognized a fundamental 
  
 37 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311(B) (2012) (using a hierarchical 
list); but see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-204 (2012) (employing a more holistic analysis). 
Courts typically inquire into who might be best to serve and prefer to appoint family 
members. See MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIPS OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE, 
AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY 73 (2005) (noting that nearly 70 percent of guardians are 
family members, with adult daughters most likely to fill the role). If no family member 
is willing or able to serve, or if there is bad blood between family members, then the 
court may appoint a professional guardian or public guardian. See Pamela B. Teaster, 
Erica F. Wood, Susan A. Lawrence & Winsor C. Schmidt, Wards of the State: A 
National Study of Public Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 240-41 (2007); Alison 
Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31 STETSON L. REV. 941, 
945-46 (2002). Professional guardians are typically subject to certification or screening 
requirements to ensure quality services. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.1083 (West 
2009) (requiring credit and criminal background checks); TEX PROB. CODE § 697 (West 
2009) (requiring letters of reference and professional certification). 
 38 See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765-66 (2005). 
 39 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 77 (“7. Affiliation. A. Being 
able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; . . . . (Protecting this capability 
means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of 
affiliation . . . .)”). 
 40 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing marriage as 
“fundamental to our very existence and survival”). 
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right to divorce.41 Regardless of its constitutional status, 
however, when considered in the context of guardian decision-
making, courts have been quick to paint the right as personal, 
deeming it nondelegable. The cases in which this issue appears 
share similar fact patterns: guardians file for divorce on behalf 
of their wards and allege wrongdoing on the part of the spouse 
with capacity.42 These cases arise because states do not spell 
out the delegability of personal decisions, such as divorce, in 
their guardianship statutes.43 This lack of guidance leaves it to 
the courts to determine whether the right to divorce should be 
implied in the general grants of authority that are given to 
guardians. The majority rule is that a guardian may not 
  
 41 See Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex 
Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 n.23 (2011). Courts, 
however, have sometimes assumed that it is implied in the right to marry, as have 
legal scholars. See, e.g., Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 904 (3d Cir. 1982); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 574-75 (1977). 
 42 See, e.g., Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, 78-79 (1878) (wife succumbed to 
mental and physical sickness due to “cruelty and neglect” on the part of her husband, 
who later abandoned her); Cowan v. Cowan, 1 N.E. 152, 152 (Mass. 1885) (husband 
abandoned wife after six weeks and did not contribute to her support, despite being 
spotted in adjoining towns). Sometimes, however, it is the wife who is accused of 
wrongdoing. See In re Marriage of Drews, 503 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. 1986) (wife 
abandoned husband to his parents’ care after he suffered a “severe and disabling head 
injury as a consequence of an automobile accident”); Mohler v. Estate of Anthony 
Shank, 61 N.W. 981, 982 (Iowa 1895) (wife committed adultery and birthed a “bastard 
child,” son of the man she married after Shank’s death). Sometimes there is a financial 
consideration, such as the desire to prevent the spouse with capacity from claiming an 
interest in marital property. See Cowan, 1 N.E. at 152 (noting an argument in favor of 
divorce “that her husband might thus be prevented from interfering with or ultimately 
sharing in her [considerable] property” that she “inherited from her father nearly seven 
years after the desertion began.”). Other times a financial interest is imputed to the 
parties by the court. See In re Jennings, 453 A.2d 572, 574-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1981) (denying the right to divorce by proxy and noting that the case would merely be a 
proxy battle over inheritance). 
 43 When states have specifically codified the power of guardians to divorce 
their wards, the answer is clear, and courts have enforced this power. See Vaughan v. 
Guardianship of Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193, 195-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(interpreting FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(4)(c) to allow the initiation of a dissolution action 
by a guardian); Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 379-80 (Mass. 1874) (enforcing 
statutory grant of authority to guardian or next friend to pursue divorce action); Denny 
v. Denny, 90 Mass. (1 Allen) 311, 313-14 (1864) (same). In other states, there is no clear 
statutory codification, but there are relevant provisions in either the guardianship or 
divorce statutes that clearly imply such a power. See Houghton v. Keller, 662 N.W.2d 
854, 855-56 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (jointly interpreting guardianship and divorce 
statutes as permitting suit for divorce by a guardian); Johnson v. Johnson, 811 S.W.2d 
822, 825-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging the right of the guardian son to pursue 
a divorce); but see Brockman v. Young, No. 2010-CA-001354-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 834, at *3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (refusing to read the statute 
mentioning the possibility of an incapacitated person prosecuting a divorce action as 
implying the right to do so). 
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pursue a divorce action.44 In fact, many states accept the 
argument that the decision to divorce is “strictly personal” in 
nature and thus cannot be delegated to another.45 Some states 
  
 44 This rule is exemplified by the case of Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867). 
Mary A. Worthy married her husband, Leonard Worthy, in 1858. Id. at 45. By late 
1865, she was “insane,” and Leonard sent her to a lunatic’s asylum near Milledgeville 
in central Georgia. Id. at 45-46. While she was confined in the asylum, her father, 
Nathan Respass, filed for divorce on her behalf, alleging that Leonard had committed 
adultery numerous times while she was away. Id. The court refused to see “the right to 
sue for a divorce in any other light than as strictly personal to the party aggrieved.” Id. 
at 46-47 (emphasis omitted). Even though Mr. Respass’s “feelings and delicacy may 
have been outraged,” no one could know if Mary felt the same way. Id. at 47. Further, 
the court argued, the law provided a remedy in the form of punishment for adultery, 
and “[d]eath only can dissolve the marriage relation without her consent.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
  Many other states have accepted the majority rule. See Cox v. Armstrong, 
221 P.2d 371, 373 (Colo. 1950) (recognizing rule); Freeman v. Freeman, 237 S.E.2d 857, 
859 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“The majority rule that a suit for divorce is so personal and 
volitional that it cannot be maintained by a guardian on behalf of an incompetent is 
sound.”); Murray ex rel. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993) (“We adopt 
the majority rule in the case of a spouse who is mentally incompetent as to his property 
and his person, and hold that he may not bring an action for divorce either on his own 
behalf or through a guardian.”); Mills, supra note 20, at 535-37 (2000) (acknowledging 
this majority rule but also a minority trend toward allowing such actions). In 
determining whether the guardian has such authority, courts are careful to note 
whether the guardianship implies a lack of decisional capacity with respect to the 
divorce decision, as guardianship over the estate does not necessarily imply the 
inability to make a decision about a personal matter like divorce. See In re Marriage of 
Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 294-95 (Cal. 1973) (noting that a person under guardianship 
may still exercise judgment and the wish to get divorced, which would be instituted 
through a guardian ad litem); Schuck v. Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 215, (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) 
(noting that the appointment of a conservator does not per se create a judgment that 
the person is insane or incompetent in a broader sense); In re Marriage of Kutchins, 
482 N.E.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (preserving the right of the ward to make 
personal decisions, even if under a guardianship of the estate, if the ward is able to 
express a desire to dissolve the marriage); Boyd v. Edwards, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the mentally ill can still marry even if under 
guardianship); State ex rel. Robedeaux v. Johnson, 418 P.2d 337, 340 (Okla. 1966) 
(noting that the purposes of a guardianship of the estate is to look after financial 
matters, not personal decisions such as divorce); Scoufos v. Fuller, 280 P.2d 720, 724 
(Okla. 1954) (comparing the capacity to divorce to testamentary capacity, and 
describing how neither is necessarily extinguished by a general finding of 
incompetence); Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 784 (preserving the right of the ward to make 
personal decisions, even if under a guardianship of the estate, if the ward “is able to 
express unequivocally a desire to dissolve the marriage”); Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 
311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same). 
 45 See Iago v. Iago, 48 N.E. 30, 31 (Ill. 1897) (defining the right to divorce as a 
personal right that requires intelligent action by the ward); State ex rel. Quear v. 
Madison Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 503, 506 (1951) (claiming that the insane cannot 
consent to the filing of a complaint); Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433, 435 (1885) 
(noting that marriage is a “a personal status and relation assumed for the joint lives of 
the parties” that cannot be dissolved without “free and voluntary consent of the 
parties”); Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889, 889 (Ky. 1943) (concluding that divorce 
is “so strictly personal and volitional” that it cannot be maintained, even if this leaves 
wards as un-divorceable); In re Babushkin, 29 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163-64 (Sup. Ct. 1941) 
(putting the decision to divorce “wholly at the volition” of the ward); Freeman, 237 
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have analogized the guardian–ward relationship to the parent-
child relationship, noting that, in that context, parents have no 
power to divorce on their child’s behalf.46 Others have 
acknowledged a public policy of safeguarding marriage, which 
they interpret as continuing marriage in light of the possible 
threats of divorce.47 
The minority trend is to allow guardians to divorce their 
wards,48 although the rationales in support of this rule vary. 
Some courts compare the decision to divorce to other decisions 
that are already deemed delegable49 or treat divorce like any 
other civil action.50 Alternatively, other courts focus on the 
ward’s experience, proclaiming a judicial duty to protect the 
ward from abuse51 or taking note of evidence of the incapacitated 
  
S.E.2d at 859; Shenk v. Shenk, 135 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (noting that a 
guardian cannot know “the real will and decision” of a ward, as that is “personal”). 
 46 See Phillips v. Phillips, 45 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Ga. 1947) (“While under our 
statutes the power of such a guardian over the person of his ward is the same as that of 
a father over his child, yet even a father cannot make decisions for his child as to 
questions of marriage and divorce.”); Mohler v. Estate of Shank, 61 N.W. 981, 983 
(Iowa 1895) (“No guardian or parent or next friend can, by any means known to the 
law, effectuate a marriage between his ward or child and another . . . . And it appears 
to us that a guardian of an insane person has no more right to maintain an action to 
dissolve the marriage relation of his ward than he has to manage and control his will in 
the matter of entering into the relation.”). 
 47 See Mohrmann v. Kob, 51 N.E.2d 921, 923-24 (N.Y. 1943) (“The State has a 
vital interest in the preservation of the marriage status—an interest which the Legislature 
has guarded jealously by the enactment of those statutes which govern divorce.”). 
 48 The case of Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba presents such a scenario. 850 P.2d 674 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). Peggy and Francisco Ruvalcaba were married in 1979 and had a 
child in 1984. Id. at 676. In 1989, Peggy suffered a traumatic head injury after falling 
off of a horse. Id. She was in a coma for several months, and when she emerged from it, 
she had several cognitive difficulties, which led to the appointment of her mother, 
Betty Stubblefield, as her guardian. Id. Betty filed a petition for divorce as well as a 
restraining order against Francisco, alleging that he had physically abused Peggy on 
several occasions, had threatened Betty, and had said that he would abscond to Mexico 
with their child if Betty filed for divorce on behalf of Peggy. Id. at 676-77. The trial 
court dismissed the petition, but the appeals court reversed. Id. at 677. In its opinion, 
the court noted the breadth of guardian powers, compared the divorce action to medical 
decision-making (noting that the latter was delegable), and warned of the possibilities 
of abuse if the divorce decision were not delegable. Id. at 683-84.  
 49 See Karbin v. Karbin, 977 N.E.2d 154, 157-58, 162 (Ill. 2012) (“With the 
concept of ‘injury’ removed from divorce in Illinois, it is difficult for us to accept the 
view that the decision to divorce is qualitatively different from any other deeply 
personal decision, such as the decision to refuse life-support treatment or the decision 
to undergo involuntary sterilization.”). 
 50 See Luster v. Luster, 17 A.3d 1068, 1078-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); In re 
Marriage of Ballard & Ballard, 762 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing 
divorce through a guardian ad litem); Wahlenmaier v. Wahlenmaier, 762 S.W.2d 575, 
575 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (same); In re Marriage of Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467 
(Wash. 1985). 
 51 See Campbell v. Campbell, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 1941) (“The court has 
ample power to protect the interest of the incompetent complainant, and the equity of 
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person’s desire for divorce prior to incapacity.52 Regardless of the 
rationale employed, the trend toward delegability is likely part 
of a more general trend toward no-fault divorce.53 The 
presumption that marriage would continue indefinitely, even 
possibly in the presence of extensive abuse, was given force 
through several legal barriers to initiating and succeeding in a 
divorce action.54 But with the institution of no-fault divorce in 
all fifty states in 2010,55 one generally need not have a reason for 
divorcing and may do so under one of the catchall grounds such as 
irreconcilable differences or irremediable breakdown.56 This trend 
has served to remove the fault system as a barrier to divorce in 
general, with likely spillover effects into guardian divorce. 
2. Wills 
The will is an instrument that serves multiple functions. 
It disposes of property,57 expresses the testator’s wishes,58 and 
  
the bill must be determined on its averments, independent of the state of the 
complainant’s mind as if he were suing of his own volition.”); Kronberg v. Kronberg, 
623 A.2d 806, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); McRae v. McRae, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778, 
780-81 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (“It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended to leave 
an insane spouse completely at the mercy of the other party to the marriage contract, 
who might then with impunity disregard marital obligations or successfully assert 
marital rights lost by misconduct.”); Carver Estate, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 743, 754-55 (C.P., 
Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1977) (noting that access to the courts to procure or apply for divorce 
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause). 
 52 See Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 339, 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) 
(recognizing the ward’s desire to end her marriage prior to incapacity as a factor in 
finding there is “no public policy or equitable justification for barring the ward’s 
guardian from bringing an action for divorce on behalf of the ward”).  
 53 The recent case of Karbin v. Karbin explicitly employs this logic, noting 
that its previous rule barring guardian divorce took root in Illinois in the earlier case of 
In re Marriage of Drews, which was governed by the fault regime. See Karbin, 977 
N.E.2d at 162 (noting how the policy objectives of the divorce regime as a whole had 
changed).  
 54 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 
1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 702 (1994) (“Traditional marriage, supported by a legal rule 
that allowed divorce only for grievous offense, was a relationship that involved a 
lifelong commitment between spouses and a status with legal attributes independent of 
the parties’ preferences.”) (footnote omitted). For instance, some demonstration of fault, 
such as abandonment, cruelty, or adultery, on behalf of one of the parties was necessary. 
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1373, 1387-88 (2000). In addition, there were several defenses to divorce claims, 
such as condonation or recrimination. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: 
Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1508 (2000). 
 55 See Joslin, supra note 41, at 1676 n.41, 1704. New York passed no-fault 
divorce in 2010. 2010 N.Y. Laws ch. 384, § 1 (Aug. 13, 2010); see also Paterson Signs 
No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at A14. 
 56 See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 188-89 (1989). 
 57 The Supreme Court has indicated that disposal of property after death 
implicates one of the fundamental sticks in the bundle of property rights—to pass on 
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represents the final statement of the testator’s social 
relationships.59 The act of making a will is thus a personal 
decision because it relates to multiple fundamental human 
capabilities, including the capabilities to have control over 
one’s property, expression, and affiliation.60 
Courts and legislatures have generally designated 
willmaking as nondelegable, viewing that decision as too 
personal to be made by another.61 Before 1998, the Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC) permitted delegations of almost every 
financial decision-making task to guardians, with the exception 
of willmaking.62 Various states incorporated this language into 
  
one’s bounty to those one deems worthy. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) 
(“In one form or another, the right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—
has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”). 
 58 See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 61 (2012) 
(noting the ways in which wills and trusts are “speech acts”). 
 59 See Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2011) (arguing that “encouraging a testator to express herself in 
her will can strengthen the testator’s connection to her personal identity and her 
community, an important step in furthering the ultimate goal of having her property 
pass as she intends and desires.”). 
 60 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 76-77 (“4. Senses, 
Imagination, Thought. . . . Being able to use one’s own mind in ways protected by 
guarantees of freedom of expression . . . . 7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and 
toward others . . . . 10. Control over One’s Environment. . . . B. Material. Being able to 
hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal 
basis with others[.]”).  
 61 See, e.g., In re Estate of Nagle, 317 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) 
(“It is an inalienable right of a testator to make a will and, as long as it is not unlawful 
and the testator is competent, it is an abuse of discretion to alter his will.”); In re 
Estate of Runals, 328 N.Y.S.2d 966, 976 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (noting that “the right to make 
a will is personal to a decedent. It is not alienable or descendable. It dies with the 
decedent.”). Several wills doctrines hinge on or support this conception of the will as 
being a personal right or expression. For example, every will must be personally signed 
by the testator. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 3.1 (2003) (“A will is validly executed if it is in writing and is signed by 
the testator and by a specified number of attesting witnesses under procedures 
provided by applicable law.”). Many states also recognize the validity of holographic 
wills, or wills executed without attestation of witnesses, so long as they are in the 
testator’s personal handwriting. See id. § 3.2 (“Statutes in many states provide that a 
will, though unwitnessed, is validly executed if it is written in the testator’s 
handwriting and signed by the testator, and, under some statutes, dated in the 
testator’s handwriting.”). Finally, the doctrine of undue influence also supports this 
personal understanding of willmaking, since it requires a showing that the will or 
volition of the testator was overcome in order to succeed. See, e.g., Caudill v. Smith, 450 
S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“To prove undue influence in the execution of a 
document, a party must show that something operated upon the mind of the person 
allegedly unduly influenced which had a controlling effect sufficient to destroy the 
person’s free agency and to render the instrument not properly an expression of the 
person’s wishes, but rather the expression of the wishes of another or others.”); 
Schmidt v. Schwear, 424 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (same). 
 62 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-407(b)(3) (2010) (“[T]he Court, for the benefit of 
the person and members of the person’s immediate family, has all the powers over the 
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their statutes.63 In 1998, the UPC was revised to enable 
conservators to write or modify the will of a ward with court 
approval,64 but only five states have enacted reforms in line with 
the most recent version of the UPC.65 Thus, the domain of wills 
prohibits personal delegations, even though the right concerned 
is primarily statutory rather than constitutional in nature.66 
The general nondelegation rule with respect to 
willmaking is not only curious when compared to health care,67 
but it is also inconsistent within the field of trusts and estates 
more generally. Individuals can already delegate decision-
making over the financial aspects of willmaking through a 
variety of mechanisms, including durable powers of attorney,68 
powers of appointment,69 and various other nonprobate 
mechanisms, such as joint bank accounts, pension accounts with 
designated beneficiaries, and trusts.70 And, as noted earlier, a 
guardian of the estate has the ability to manipulate the ward’s 
assets in various ways during life, which likely has a more 
profound impact on the ward’s well-being than the additional 
power to dispose of assets at death. 
It seems surprising, then, that the willmaking power is 
nondelegable in most states. One possible explanation is that 
courts wish to safeguard the expressive function of wills, since 
the financial aspects are already delegable by other means. 
This, however, does not cure the inconsistency. First, much 
estate planning in practice is done through the use of form 
wills and other instruments, which has reduced the importance 
  
estate and business affairs which the person could exercise if present and not under 
disability, except the power to make a will.”). 
 63 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5407(2)(c) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 3B:12-49 (West 2006); Brashier, supra note 28, at 83-85 n.72 (compiling statutes). 
 64 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7) (2010).  
 65 See Brashier, supra note 28, at 69 n.23. Other states only allow delegation 
of the power to modify a will for certain narrow tax purposes. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/11a-18 (West 2007) (allowing a delegation for general tax purposes); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 744.441(18) (West 2011) (allowing a delegation only in the case of an estate tax 
charitable deduction). 
 66 See United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) (noting that the 
right to dispose of property by will is within legislative control). 
 67 See infra Part I.B.3. 
 68 See infra Part III.A. 
 69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 17.1(c) (2003) (“[A] power of appointment 
traditionally confers the authority to designate recipients of beneficial ownership interests in or 
powers of appointment over property that the donee does not own.”).  
 70 See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the 
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). 
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of the testator’s voice in the construction of wills.71 More 
importantly, trustmaking can be an equally expressive endeavor, 
yet it remains readily delegable.72 
While the trend is toward making various aspects of 
willmaking delegable, the historical rule has been one of 
prohibition, which seems odd in light of estate planning’s 
overall shift toward delegability of financial decision-making. 
3. Health Care 
Health-care decisions facilitate good health and improve 
life expectancy. As discrete decisions, they have perhaps the 
most direct impact on the fundamental capabilities of life and 
bodily health.73 In the American jurisprudential scheme, 
decisions about bodily integrity, which include health-care 
decisions, are considered to lie at the root of personal 
autonomy.74 In constitutional law, several theories support this 
  
 71 Some commentators have argued that willmaking should become even 
more standardized. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals 
Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 920-37 (2012) (arguing for the attachment of a 
“testamentary schedule” to tax returns as a way of promoting willmaking and avoiding 
intestacy). Others have urged the opposite. See Gordon, supra note 59, at 383-84. 
 72 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts specifically notes how a general policy of 
prohibition of delegations could indeed apply to trusts as well: 
[T]he will-making prohibition may instead manifest a more general, 
substantive policy against post-death dispositions by these fiduciaries that 
would alter the plan of disposition established by intestate succession or by 
an existing will executed by a person who has subsequently become 
incompetent. 
The breadth and generality of the latter policy would ordinarily apply by 
analogy to limit the post-death distributive provisions of a revocable inter 
vivos trust created by a legal representative or agent to dispositions that 
conform to the disposition of the affected property that would result, as the 
case may be, by operation of law or under the incompetent person’s existing 
estate plan. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f (2003) (citation omitted). The 
Restatement diffuses the difficulty by concluding that a narrower policy, based on 
“efficiency and tradition,” justifies the proxy willmaking prohibition, though it is 
unclear what efficiencies result from authorizing guardians to make dispositions 
through will substitutes but not by will. 
 73 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 76 (“1. Life. Being able to live 
to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is 
so reduced as to be not worth living. 2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, 
including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”). 
 74 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is 
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”). 
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understanding, including a positive right to privacy,75 a 
protected liberty interest,76 and a dignitary interest in being 
free from governmental intrusion into one’s body.77 Informed 
consent in medical tort law is also based on the idea that 
patients possess the ultimate right of decision with regard to 
questions of bodily integrity.78  
Given the sacrosanct nature of these decisions, it is 
somewhat surprising that the large majority of them are also 
readily delegable. In fact, because most states have enacted 
statutory surrogacy laws, health-care decision-makers need not 
go through the cumbersome guardianship process to acquire 
decision-making authority.79 If there is a serious dispute 
between family members, the issue might end up in court; but 
generally, these proxy decisions are not subject to judicial 
approval or oversight. Instead, they are constrained by the 
medical profession’s standard of care and code of ethics.80 As a 
result, the whole decision-making process is taken outside the 
realm of the law and instead is relocated in the physician-
family relationship.81 
  
 75 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (recognizing a sphere of 
personal privacy that protected a variety of autonomous decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (protecting a right to the use of contraception, regardless of 
marital status). 
 76 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) 
(recognizing a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment).  
 77 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that 
forcibly pumping a suspect’s stomach for evidence “shocks the conscience” and violates 
his right to privacy).  
 78 See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”), abrogated by Bing v. 
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). 
 79 Prior to the passage of such laws, physicians relied informally on family 
decision-makers without involvement of the law or the courts. See LAWRENCE A. 
FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION MAKING 219-21 (2006) 
(“The natural and customary reliance upon next of kin to make medical decisions for 
the mentally incapacitated is so deeply ingrained that it is rarely challenged.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 49 (Ky. 2004) 
(“[J]udicial intervention into private decision-making of this sort is expensive and 
intrusive. It is both impossibly cumbersome and a gratuitous encroachment upon the 
medical profession’s field of competence. Thus, unless the interested parties disagree, 
resort to the courts is unwarranted.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); 
John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REV. 101, 106-07 
(2005) (“The few disputes that have percolated up to the courts have been of two types. 
One type has involved cases in which doctors or hospitals refused to follow advance 
directives or proxy requests for or against treatment. The second type, of which Schiavo is 
an example, involves disputes between family members over a course of action.”). 
 81 See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
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While most health-care decisions fall within the scheme 
outlined above, some decisions are regulated more closely. 
These decisions arise in areas where the state has a perceived 
interest to protect, such as the preservation of life.82 For 
example, many states require guardians to demonstrate the 
previous wishes of the ward by clear and convincing evidence, a 
higher evidentiary standard, before permitting them to make a 
decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.83 The Supreme 
Court has ratified such evidentiary hurdles, rejecting arguments 
that they represent unconstitutional infringements on the ward’s 
right to refuse medical treatment through their guardians.84 
Another example arises in the area of transplantation of a ward’s 
organs for the benefit of a third party, which typically requires 
judicial approval.85 
Thus, health-care decisions—those at the root of 
multiple fundamental capabilities—are readily delegable to 
others, oftentimes without judicial intervention or oversight. 
 
* * * 
 
The law has developed several mechanisms for dealing 
with the delegation of decision-making when incapacity strikes, 
but it has limited the use of these mechanisms for certain 
classes of decisions. While this part was primarily descriptive in 
exploring the mechanisms and how they are employed 
  
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 128 (1983), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/ 
pcbe/reports/past_commissions/deciding_to_forego_tx.pdf (offering five reasons for deferring 
to the family). If a ward has gone through the guardianship process and has a guardian, 
then the guardian will be in the same role as the statutory surrogate. See id. at 128-30. 
 82 See John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of 
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1140-41 (1991) 
(discussing the policy of “vitalism”). 
 83 See Alicia Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination 
Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 
79 IND. L.J. 1, 48-55 (2004) (compiling statutes).  
 84 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1990). 
 85 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Ky. 1969) (authorizing 
transplant of kidney to brother based on a best interests standard and justifying it by 
noting the relationship the incapacitated person had with his brother); In re Doe, 481 
N.Y.S.2d 932, 932 (App. Div. 1984) (authorizing bone marrow donation as the record 
had demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that it was in the ward’s best 
interests); In re Pescinski, 266 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (not authorizing kidney 
transplant to sister, finding that the ward had not consented and that the transplant 
was not in the ward’s best interests). For analysis of these types of cases, see generally 
Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1215 (2002); John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the 
Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 48 (1976). 
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inconsistently in three particular domains, the next part examines 
the normative arguments justifying access to these mechanisms. 
II. DELEGATION RATIONALES 
This part examines the rationales for delegation of 
personal decision-making authority. First, it examines how the 
capabilities approach applies to the cognitive-impairment 
context, arguing that it requires equal access to personal 
decisions for those lacking decisional capacity. This, in turn, 
requires that they be able to make the decisions through a 
surrogate. This part then considers alternative normative 
arguments for delegation that derive from the legal standards 
governing the decision-making of surrogates: the substituted 
judgment and best interests approaches. Finally, this part 
examines the rationale courts use to justify a nondelegation 
rule—that certain decisions are too personal to be delegated to 
another—concluding that it is unavailing. 
A. Capability, Dignity, and Disability  
The capabilities approach posits that a life worthy of 
human dignity is one in which a person has the capability to 
achieve certain functionings that society considers central to 
the human experience. These functionings might embrace the 
ability to do certain things (for example, to worship the faith of 
one’s choice) or the ability to achieve certain states of being (for 
example, having good health).86 A given person’s capabilities 
are a “product of her internal endowments, her external 
resources, and the social and physical environment in which 
she lives.”87 Thus, in order to respect the inherent worth of 
individuals, a just society must provide the means through 
which individuals can exercise their capabilities. This can be 
accomplished by developing the internal endowments an 
individual possesses, altering the external resources afforded to 
her, restructuring the physical or social environment in which 
she lives, or allowing access to decisions that inhere in those 
  
 86 See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 21, at 86-96. 
 87 See Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in 
MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid 
Robeyns eds., 2010). 
1250 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
fundamental capabilities.88 These steps ensure that individuals 
flourish and lead lives worthy of human dignity.89  
For certain types of capabilities, this simply means that 
society must provide them at an adequate level. For example, 
while a just society may require that individuals have access to 
adequate shelter, that society need not ensure that each 
citizen’s housing be equal in size or quality.90 But for other types 
of capabilities, the only way to ensure their adequacy is to 
ensure that they are provided on an equal basis. For example, 
political, religious, or civil liberties must be provided equally in 
order to be provided adequately.91 Moreover, personal decisions 
fall in the same category—individuals must have equal access to 
them in order for their provision to be adequate.92 
All citizens belonging to the human community are 
entitled to achieve these capabilities, and those with cognitive 
impairment should not be excluded from this human community 
simply because they lack the capacity to engage in certain forms 
of practical reasoning.93 While rationality may be what 
separates us from some other animals in a descriptive sense, it 
is not the sole defining feature of a life worthy of human 
  
 88 Decision-making is built in to the capabilities approach, as personal 
decisions must be available to allow one to achieve certain functionings. Not all 
decision-making is per se fundamental though—it needs to be connected to some other 
fundamental capability to achieve that status and to be subject to the analysis of this 
article. For example, it would be difficult to characterize the decision to use a plate or a 
bowl to eat a routine meal as connected to some fundamental human capability. Thus, 
it is not a personal decision, and would not be subject to the same analysis. 
 89 See id. 
 90 Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, 
in COGNITIVE DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 79-80 (Eva 
Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010). 
 91 Id.; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 
ETHICS 287, 312-15 (1999) (arguing for a democratic conception of equality that justifies 
this understanding of adequacy as meaning equality in this instance). 
 92 Nussbaum, supra note 90, at 79-80. As noted in Part I, personal decisions 
are defined in terms of the relevant normative theory. Here, it is the capabilities 
approach, so personal decisions are defined as those that are implicated in 
fundamental human capabilities. Equal access can, of course, come in different forms 
(e.g. making a personal decision oneself versus relying on a surrogate to assist in 
making a personal decision), so long as access is achieved in a meaningful way. 
 93 While psychologically this may impact our perceptions of people with 
cognitive impairment as persons in some moral sense, this should not necessarily 
control the moral value we attribute to this population. See generally Heikki Ikäheimo, 
Personhood and the Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities: A Recognition-
Theoretical Approach, in ARGUING ABOUT DISABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
77-92 (Kristjana Kristiansen et al. eds., 2009) (examining how our recognition of people 
with disabilities as persons informs our judgments of personhood). 
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dignity.94 Indeed, our humanity is also defined by, among other 
things, our capabilities to live in good health, experience things 
with our senses, form social attachments, and enjoy recreational 
activities. Only if an individual’s capacity to exercise a 
significant cluster of these capabilities were cut off—for 
instance, in the case of someone in a permanent coma or 
persistent vegetative state—might we think that a person had 
perhaps stopped being part of the human community.95 
Some might note that the loss of decisional capacity, a 
biological and perhaps unchangeable fact, causes the lack of 
capabilities. But a deeper analysis would see it as a 
combination of both the loss of capacity and the imposition of 
barriers that prevent guardians or other surrogates from 
making these types of decisions on behalf of their wards. These 
barriers, which manifest themselves in the form of nondelegation 
doctrines, serve to disempower those who lack decisional capacity, 
cutting them off from the capabilities to achieve functionings 
consistent with a life worthy of human dignity. As a symbolic 
matter, this is disconcerting because it sends the message that 
those with cognitive impairment are not worthy of the capabilities 
that inhere in the concept of human dignity. As a practical 
matter, it is troubling because those with cognitive impairment 
may still have preferences or interests that could be expressed 
through such surrogate decision-making. 
The reality for those living with cognitive impairment is 
that they must have access to someone who can assist them or 
act in their stead in order to realize equal access to personal 
decisions. For those who lack decisional capacity but can still 
communicate some form of preference, the task of the surrogate 
decision-maker or guardian is to elicit those preferences and 
transform them into a decision. For those who cannot even 
communicate any form of preference, the surrogate must be able 
to stand in for them, following a ward’s preexisting life plan or 
making the decisions based on the ward’s present best interests.96  
It might at first seem strange to suggest that having a 
surrogate assist in making decisions for a cognitively impaired 
  
 94 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 179-95. This is not to 
downplay the importance of practical reason in facilitating the other fundamental 
human capabilities. It is, in fact, central. Being able to form one’s conception of the 
good life and plan one’s life accordingly is what gives much of the content to the 
personal decisions that are actualizations of the various fundamental capabilities. 
 95 See id. In these cases, we might still support delegation of certain types of 
decisions for other reasons, but the rationale would need to come from some other theory. 
 96 See Nussbaum, supra note 90, at 79-80. 
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person actually realizes that person’s capabilities. Personal 
assistants and assistive technologies, however, do not signal 
dependency or inauthentic autonomy. The disability rights 
movement has long argued that assistance is a form of 
empowerment and a guarantee of control over one’s life and 
environment.97 Feminist analyses of dependency also clarify the 
difference between “socially necessary dependence” and “surplus 
dependence.” The former is an “inescapable feature of the 
human condition,” while the latter is “rooted in unjust and 
potentially remediable social institutions.”98 Declines in 
cognitive abilities may be inescapable for many individuals as 
they age, but being disempowered by those cognitive deficits is, 
in fact, an unjust and remediable social institution. 
This principle is best illustrated by an analogy to 
mobility impairments. A person without functioning legs lacks 
the capacity to travel freely from place to place without 
assistance; however, it would be incorrect to view this solely as 
the product of the physical impairment.99 It may also be the 
product of the lack of resources to purchase a wheelchair or the 
absence of a physical environment designed to enable access to 
streets and buildings with said wheelchair. If society were to 
provide the person with mobility impairments a wheelchair 
and an accessible environment, it could not then be said that 
that person is not truly experiencing movement or travel. 
Clearly, it is a different experience, but that person is still 
experiencing movement and travel, despite the fact that it is 
facilitated through alternative mechanisms that most people 
need not use. 
Similarly, society should allow those with cognitive 
impairments to plan ahead and select surrogates who will act 
  
 97 See, e.g., Alan Roulstone, Researching a Disabling Society: The Case of 
Employment and New Technology, in THE DISABILITY READER: SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVES 110-28 (Tom Shakespeare ed., 1998) (describing the role and importance 
of assistive technology in the employment context); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 999-
1000 (2003) (describing the philosophy of the independent living movement). The 
experiences of those with physical and mental impairments are not entirely parallel, 
however. Another crucial component of the independent living philosophy is the idea of 
consumer control over personal assistants, which may not be realizable to the same 
degree for people with cognitive impairments. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of 
Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 75-81 (2004) (describing the role of consumer control).  
 98 See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “Dependency” Demystified: Inscriptions 
of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State, 1 SOC. POL. 4-31 (1994).  
 99 This is an area where the capabilities approach converges with and 
complements the social model of disability. See generally MICHAEL OLIVER, THE 
POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990). 
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on their behalf if they lose decisional capacity, and it should 
create a set of default mechanisms to govern those who do not 
have such foresight. If society provides legal mechanisms to 
enable an individual to make personal decisions with the 
assistance of a surrogate, this does not mean that that person 
is not truly experiencing the capabilities facilitated by such 
decision-making. Again, the experience or outcome is certainly 
different, and that difference is a necessary byproduct of the 
cognitive impairment. But that difference alone, however, is not 
sufficient to deprive an individual of an aspect of the human 
experience that provides access to many of the other fundamental 
human capabilities that she might still be able to enjoy.100 
There is a final point to address before moving on. Mere 
provision of fundamental capabilities does not mean that one is 
required to exercise them to achieve the functionings they 
facilitate.101 The same holds true with respect to the personal 
decisions that are the subject of this analysis. No one is required 
to divorce, make a will, or seek health care in order to lead a life 
worthy of human dignity, even if equal access to these 
opportunities is part of having the capabilities that we deem 
integral to a life worthy of human dignity. Similarly, surrogates 
would not be required to make these decisions either, provided 
that opting not to do so did not indicate some lack of capability 
or breach of fiduciary duty.102 The next subpart examines the 
standards for decision-making once a surrogate is empowered 
and suggests that other normative arguments for personal 
delegations might be derived from them. 
B. Autonomy, Preferences, and Welfare 
The capabilities approach requires equal access to 
decisions that implicate fundamental human capabilities, both 
  
 100 The analogy between physical and cognitive impairments exposes a tension 
in the field of disability studies about the role of guardianship as an empowering or 
disempowering institution. See Michael Bérubé, Equality, Freedom, and/or Justice for 
All: A Response to Martha Nussbaum, in COGNITIVE DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE 
TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 90, at 97, 102-03. 
 101 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 171-73. Thus, the argument 
from the capabilities approach does not rely on a particular theory of what the content 
of surrogate decision-making should be; it merely posits that such surrogate decision-
making should be allowed to occur. 
 102 At the same time, as a practical matter we might suspect that capabilities 
are not present if there is no exercise of the decisions that inhere in those capabilities. 
It may not be the result of choice, but instead of some undeveloped endowment, lack of 
material resources, or environmental barriers. See id. 
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to recognize the dignity of people with cognitive impairments 
and as a matter of social justice.103 There are other justifications 
for permitting or opposing personal delegations, which rely on 
alternative normative intuitions. This subpart sketches out 
some of these justifications by exploring the two legal decision-
making standards that govern surrogate decision-making: 
substituted judgment and best interests. In other words, by 
understanding what surrogates should be doing once empowered, 
we can better understand why they should be empowered in the 
first place. It is important to note that there is a sizable literature 
about which decision-making standard to prefer,104 but this article 
does not seek to resolve that particular debate. The narrower 
task is to tease out the normative intuitions that underlie these 
models of surrogate decision-making and examine how they 
might apply to the question of personal delegations. 
1. Substituted Judgment 
When a surrogate decision-maker finds herself 
empowered to make decisions, in many states she lacks any 
guidance about the legal standards that govern her decision-
making.105 But for those states that have addressed the issue, the 
  
 103 It does not, however, specify a conception of the self over time (pre- and 
post-incapacity), nor does it suggest what legal standard of decision-making should 
govern a guardian or attorney-in-fact once empowered. 
 104 See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 26, at 10-12 (taking the middle-
ground on appropriate approach for surrogate decision-making for the incapacitated); 
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 190-96 (1993) (describing the three issues of 
autonomy, best interests, and sanctity that run through this type of decision-making); 
ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY: PROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY 
AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE xvii (2001) (advocating for prospective 
decisional autonomy); Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best 
Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent 
Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1996) (arguing 
for a dignity-based approach); Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy 
for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (2003) (arguing for a best 
interests approach that addresses the present interests of the ward); Leslie Pickering 
Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or Other 
Dementias, 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 540, 591-92 (2001) (arguing for the precedence of 
autonomy-based decision-making procedures, so long as they do not result in pain to 
the incapacitated ward); Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted 
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 739, 741 (2012); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: 
Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 888 (1992) (arguing for a best 
interests test when the patient did not express a prior preference). 
 105 See Carolyn Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of 
Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 587-88 (1996) (calling for clarity on 
the attorney-in-fact’s duty to act); Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate 
Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
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common view is that the surrogate must employ a substituted 
judgment standard.106 When a surrogate exercises substituted 
judgment, she must mimic, to the extent possible, the decisions 
the ward would make if the ward had capacity.107 Originating in 
the common law of lunacy, the theory behind this subjective 
test is that it safeguards the ward’s autonomy and preserves a 
state of the world that the ward would find desirable if she 
were to regain capacity.108 
Central to this standard is an understanding of the 
individual as an autonomous actor with preferences that 
survive incapacity. As such, the preferences a person had in the 
past should presumptively govern the future incapacitated self 
as well.109 When examined in the context of personal decisions 
and delegations, carrying these preferences through time takes 
on special importance, given that they are heavily involved in 
the process of self-definition and reflect certain core 
commitments, life plans, or ideals about the good life. 
Philosophers have devised many terms to describe these types of 
  
1491, 1495 (2012) (noting that out of fifty-two jurisdictions considered (the fifty states, 
Washington D.C., and the Virgin Islands), twenty-eight had no legal standard for 
guardian decision-making). 
 106 See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 105 (noting that eighteen jurisdictions 
adhere to a substituted judgment standard, usually in combination with a best 
interests standard, while six jurisdictions adhere simply to a best interests standard). 
 107 See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (Ill. 1990) (“The doctrine of 
substituted judgment requires a surrogate decisionmaker to attempt to establish, with 
as much accuracy as possible, what decision the patient would make if [the patient] 
were competent to do so.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 108 See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1990). The lunatic was someone who 
previously had capacity, but now either lacks it completely or has interludes of lucidity. 
The lunatic was contrasted with the “idiot,” who was never competent. Id. at 17-18. 
This standard raises evidentiary issues, specifically what is required to establish the 
ward’s past preferences. Some states have required public statements of preference on 
the specific decision at issue. See, e.g., In re Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr. ex rel. 
O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y. 
1981) (involving a Brother of the Society of Mary who had publically declared that he 
did not wish life-sustaining treatment during conversations about the case of Karen 
Ann Quinlan). Other states have accepted a more holistic analysis, examining the 
ward’s religious beliefs or general values. See In re Jobes, 529 N.E.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 
1987) (requiring surrogate decision-makers to consult the ward’s “relevant 
philosophical, theological, and ethical values”); see also DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 
698, 708-09 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 758 (Md. 1993). 
 109 See OLICK, supra note 104, at 45-112 (laying out the ethical argument for 
prospective decisional autonomy); see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1986) (describing harm as a “setback [to] interests”). 
This approach rejects the notion that incapacity creates a new self that is disconnected 
from a former self that might have inhabited the same body. See OLICK, supra note 
104, at 127-51. 
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commitments—“critical interests,”110 “second-order desires,”111 
“ulterior interests,”112 or simply “projects”113—but the key point 
is that they are important to maintaining a sense of self and are 
heavily interwoven with identity. Some of these projects might 
be interpersonal in nature (for example, devotion to family or 
maintenance of important relationships), while others may be 
quite unique to the individual (for example, being known for 
having a particular quality, such as fashion sense, or for 
achieving fame in a particular sport or game, such as online 
poker). If we presume that the same person exists before and 
after incapacity, then maintaining these life plans after 
incapacity is of fundamental importance. 
Whereas under the capabilities approach we would 
define personal decisions as those that implicate fundamental 
capabilities, under a substituted judgment approach we might 
define personal decisions as those that are implicated in 
especially important commitments that have some identity-
forming function. Under this approach, delegating decision-
making authority or maintaining a status quo outcome by 
prohibiting personal delegations could both be viewed as ways 
of exercising prospective decisional autonomy. Moreover, many 
personal decisions taken while a person still has capacity 
create a status quo outcome that is likely preferred by the 
individual through time. This fact alone, however, is not a 
reason to prohibit delegation of personal decisions to a 
surrogate.114 First, altering the status quo outcome may be the 
  
 110 See DWORKIN, supra note 104, at 201-02 (characterizing critical interests 
as fundamental to making sense of one’s existence, and contrasting them with simple 
experiential interests).  
 111 See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 
68 J. PHIL. 5, 6-7 (1971) (“Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this 
and that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires or motives.”). 
 112 See FEINBERG, supra note 109, at 36-45 (describing these as interests that 
we value as ends in themselves). 
 113 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 5 (1981) (describing our projects as 
those enterprises that shape our character); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 16-20 (1988). 
 114 For example, one could argue that one might best approximate what most 
wards’ preferences are by favoring a status quo outcome, if certain conditions are met. 
The argument would be strongest if the status quo outcome would be favored by a large 
majority of wards, if circumstances would be relatively stable in that decisional domain 
such that the expression of the preference would not run counter to some other higher-
order preference of the ward, and if delegation to a surrogate would for some reason 
result in a substantial level of abuse, leading to outcomes that a ward would not favor. 
It is not clear that these conditions hold strongly in many of the decisional domains 
considered here, but the argument can certainly be made for a prohibition of personal 
delegations on this basis. 
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best way of safeguarding an individual’s life plan if circumstances 
change. This is clearest in the case of health care, where changing 
health conditions and treatment options might dictate a different 
way of honoring a person’s preexisting preferences. Second, the 
status quo outcome is not necessarily always reflective of a 
decision made by the individual. This is clearest in the case of 
voting, where the status quo outcome would represent 
nonparticipation in the political system, which may or may not 
reflect the individual’s prior political participation. 
Thus, if one adheres to the ideas of prospective 
decisional autonomy, continuous personal identity, and the 
importance of preserving preexisting life plans, then one might 
find the rationale behind the substituted judgment standard to 
be an attractive reason to permit delegation of at least some 
personal decisions. 
2. Best Interests 
Sometimes it is impossible to know what the ward 
would have wanted, either because she did not express a 
concrete opinion on a subject or because her other known 
values are indeterminate in their application to a specific 
factual situation. Alternatively, one might believe that the 
ward’s incapacity so alters the self that it has created a new 
person, who should not be bound by the ward’s previously 
expressed wishes.115 In either case, the guardian must shift to a 
best interests test.116 Under this standard, the guardian must 
do what is objectively best for the ward.117 
The application of the best interests analysis depends 
on the measure of welfare one adopts. In the same way, the 
definition of a personal decision also varies according to the 
normative theory one selects. Under the best interests analysis, 
  
 115 For the strongest proponent of this type of view in philosophy, see 
generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). For an application of this work 
to the law, see Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L., 
MED., & HEALTH CARE 234, 240-41 (1989) (arguing for a present interests approach). 
 116 See Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for 
Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386, 407-08 (“In some of the cases where the 
substituted judgment standard yields no defensible result, the courts should retreat to 
the traditional doctrine of parens patriae and act in the incompetent’s best interests.”).  
 117 See In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ill. 1994) (“Under the ‘best interests’ 
test, the court is guided by an objective standard of what a reasonable person would 
prefer under the circumstances of the particular case.”). This test originates in the law 
of child custody. See Harmon, supra note 108, at 30 n.170, 32-33. 
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personal decisions would be defined as those likely to affect 
welfare, however defined, in substantial ways.118 Subjective 
measures of welfare, such as preference satisfaction,119 might be 
difficult to implement in the case of decisional incapacity. 
Indeed, if a court has determined that a person lacks decisional 
capacity, then a judgment exists that the ward’s cognitive 
processes governing preference formation or reasoning are 
impaired. If an individual can no longer form preferences, then 
it is not clear that preference satisfaction functions well as a 
measure of welfare in this context. On the other hand, if an 
individual can still formulate preferences that should be 
honored but needs assistance converting those preferences into 
a set of decisions or a coherent life plan, then a guardian or 
attorney-in-fact may be best positioned to assist in doing so. 
This suggests that personal delegations should be permitted to 
allow this process to take place.120 
The best interests of the ward could also be measured 
according to some objective criteria, such as whether a given 
decision reflects the preferences of a reasonable person in the 
ward’s circumstances or promotes certain virtues.121 If the 
objective criteria in question are easily connected to a status 
quo outcome, then a bar on personal delegations (to maintain 
said status quo outcome) would be preferable to individualized 
decision-making by a surrogate. For example, if one believed 
that the continuation of life through the use of feeding tubes 
represented a positive outcome for the individual and society in 
most instances, or if a consensus existed in society that this was 
the case, then a default rule requiring that outcome would be 
superior to personal delegations that might allow a surrogate to 
deviate from that outcome. But absent an argument for this 
outcome or a societal consensus on the topic, it is not clear that 
  
 118 Again, the definition of personal decisions in the best interests approach 
will overlap significantly with other normative approaches, though it of course depends 
on the theory of welfare one selects. 
 119 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 28-35 (2006) (discussing this welfarist approach). 
 120 Some scholars have revived the classic hedonic conception of subjective 
welfare. See generally John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 
1593-1600 (2010). Applying this formulation of welfare to the case of decisional 
incapacity raises a host of empirical questions. So long as a person lacking decisional 
capacity is capable of experiencing pleasure or pain, we would need to know whether 
allowing personal delegations would increase or decrease aggregate happiness 
measured at moments in time, including those moments that occur post-incapacity. Id. 
 121 See generally PHILLIPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001) (promoting such 
a virtue ethics approach); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65 
(2006) (applying this approach to judging and justice more generally).  
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barring personal delegations would lead to fulfillment of the 
ward’s best interests in a given decisional domain. The rise of 
personalized default rules may make it possible to tailor status 
quo outcomes to particular populations, but these rules are still 
in their infancy, and it is not clear that they would apply to 
personal decisions as well as they apply to financial ones.122 
The normative intuitions underlying the substituted 
judgment and best interests standards of decision-making help 
us understand alternative rationales for personal delegations. 
Having briefly considered them, the next subpart critiques the 
primary argument courts use to justify a nondelegation rule for 
personal decision-making authority, namely that some 
decisions are too personal to delegate to another. 
C.  The Personal in Personal Decisions 
Having examined the case for delegating personal 
decisions, I turn now to potential objections. These objections 
derive from courts’ justifications of nondelegation rules—
specifically, the classification of a decision as personal. The 
Luster court suggested two possible rationales underlying the 
concept of the personal that justify a nondelegation rule, and 
these are echoed throughout the case law.123 The first refers to 
personal preferences that are idiosyncratic, such as certain 
tastes.124 Some people abhor bitter drinks, while others find 
them to be a refreshing palate cleanser. These preferences are 
not easily predictable, even if they are occasionally expressed 
publicly. In fact, the reasons for these preferences, whatever 
they may be, may have comprehensible meaning only to the 
original decision-maker, if at all. 
  
 122 See Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. 
Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, 1, 4-5 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171343 (discussing the tradeoffs 
between different types of default rules (societal or personalized) and active choices and 
exploring the points at which it might make sense to favor one strategy over another). 
 123 See supra Part I.B. 
 124 See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics 
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2122-23 (1996) (discussing how unstable preferences can 
complicate otherwise straightforward law and economics analyses); Mark Kelman, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1363 (2003) 
(“[T]he idea that we can speak intelligibly about developing institutions that effectively 
respond to ‘tastes’ depends on the notion that there are stable tastes to respond to, 
rather than on the notion that there are far more shifting, unstable preferences that 
appear or disappear, depending upon how we elicit them.”). 
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The second is that the preferences underlying personal 
decisions may be particularly private or unrevealed to others.125 
Part of this rationale stems from the fact that personal 
decisions occur in private and thus cannot be observed by 
others. For example, most people have sex only in the presence 
of their sexual partners. Without knowing what particular 
decision was made in the privacy of the home, it is difficult for 
others to theorize about the preferences underlying the 
decision. Moreover, if the decision occurs only rarely, then the 
possibility of observation will be even more difficult. For 
example, many people do not repeatedly divorce or make 
decisions about their own end-of-life health care, meaning that 
opportunities to observe the decision before incapacity strikes 
may be very limited. Finally, even if the decision is observed, 
unless the ward has explained her reasoning behind the 
decision, it may not be possible to decipher her underlying 
preferences and how they might apply to a novel situation.126 
In short, both of these characterizations of personal 
preferences point to the same conclusion: a surrogate decision-
maker is likely to get the decision wrong because the ward’s 
preferences are unpredictable or unknowable. Even if these 
accounts have merit, they are not an indictment of personal 
delegations per se but rather of the application of the 
substituted judgment standard for surrogate decision-making 
in personal domains. If there were no other workable decision-
making standard, then a simple nondelegation rule might be 
prudent. But that is not the case. The best interests standard 
can guide surrogate decision-making in the place of the 
substituted judgment standard, and it has proven at least 
workable in the context of children.127 
  
 125 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 n.46 (1998) (noting how 
economists consider preferences “revealed” when choices are made); Bailey Kuklin, The 
Gaps Between the Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 853-55 (1992) 
(noting the difficulties that economics have in predicting preferences that are unstable or 
unrevealed); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 932 
(1996) (noting how economists consider preferences “revealed” when choices are made). 
 126 Various types of personal preferences may not even be operative in the 
situation of incapacity. If a ward previously bought and read books on her iPad, and 
now does not have the ability to process such text, it would not make sense to continue 
buying books and giving her an iPad to play with. The preference has no meaning in 
the new context. 
 127 See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1221, 1242-43 (2011); but see Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best 
Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1987). There is some literature 
developing what might constitute “best interests” for a person lacking decisional capacity. 
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Thus, there needs to be some additional argument why 
personal delegations are inherently invalid. One might argue 
that prohibiting personal delegations serves a useful function 
in protecting personhood, as personal delegations may violate 
the inalienable nature of personal decisions.128 Those favoring 
inalienability of certain goods claim that making them 
alienable through a market mechanism constitutes a type of 
violence to personhood that inhibits human flourishing.129 
Proponents argue that if certain goods are even partially 
transformed into commodities, market rhetoric will 
inappropriately come to dominate our understanding of them.130 
But is delegation of personal decisions subject to the same sort 
of argument? Perhaps certain decisions are so intimately 
associated with personal identity or a person’s social 
relationships that allowing those decisions to be made by 
another would do violence to personhood or human flourishing. 
In the context of marriage, many individuals view their 
  
See Bruce Jennings, Agency and Moral Relationship in Dementia, in COGNITIVE 
DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 90, at 171. 
 128 Delegation of personal decisions deems the right of decision over personal 
matters alienable. See Donald Van de Veer, Are Human Rights Alienable?, 37 PHIL. 
STUD. 165, 168 (1980) (“[S]o long as A by some act or omission ceases to have a right 
formerly possessed, whether or not that right is acquired by another, A alienates that 
right. So, if a right is transferable, waivable, or forfeitable, the right is alienable.”). 
This type of argument is familiar in property law and acts as a justification for 
prohibiting the transfer of body parts for monetary gain. The classic take on 
inalienability rules in the law comes from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972) (“[R]ules of inalienability not only ‘protect’ the 
entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or regulating the grant of the 
entitlement itself.”). Inalienability rules can take many forms. See Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852-55 (1987) (noting that 
separation from the self is the key to the concept of inalienability, and differentiating 
nonforfeitability, nonwaivability, nongivability, nonsalability, and nontransferability); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 931, 933-37 (1985) (recognizing three dimensions to property rights—who may 
hold the entitlement, what actions must be taken or not taken to maintain the 
entitlement, and what kinds of transfers are permitted). 
 129 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 88 (1996) 
(“Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to 
personhood because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person.”). 
Radin admits that “[t]here is no algorithm or abstract formula to tell us which items 
are (justifiably) personal. A moral judgment is required in each case.” Radin, supra 
note 128, at 1908. For a contrary view, see Richard A. Epstein, The Human and 
Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 459 (2008) (arguing for a market in kidneys). 
 130 To demonstrate how this might be the case, Radin uses the example of how 
some theorists of law and economics try to understand prohibitions on rape in terms of 
market logic. RADIN, supra note 129, at 87 (“[F]or all but the deepest enthusiast [of law 
and economics], market rhetoric seems intuitively out of place here, so inappropriate 
that it is either silly, or somehow insulting to the value being discussed, or both.”). 
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decisions to stay married as intimately intertwined with their 
identity as a married person.131 Similarly, a will often 
represents an individual’s final statement about her 
relationships and her conception of how her property should be 
distributed to her heirs.132 In the health-care context, a decision 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment or donate an organ to a 
relative might reflect intimate religious beliefs.133 The alleged 
danger lies in the notion that delegation may come to dominate 
our understanding of these types of decisions. If the law can 
simply designate another to make these decisions for us, the 
argument goes, then we may lose the exclusive sphere of 
personal decision-making that allows us to construct our 
identities and relationships with others. 
In the context of personal decisions and incapacity, this 
argument is unpersuasive. Invoking the personal nature of a 
decision to justify a nondelegation rule confuses nondelegability 
for nondecision. If a surrogate is prohibited from making a 
decision for an incapacitated ward, this does not mean that a 
personal decision is not being made. To the contrary, 
nondelegation merely makes a decision in favor of a status quo 
outcome, whatever that may be.134 The decision being made may 
be obscured by the language courts use, but it is relatively easy 
to identify upon closer inspection. In the case of divorce, the 
status quo is the continuance of marriage, and thus the default 
rule is anti-divorce. Likewise, prohibitions on delegation of the 
decision to marry would maintain the status quo of being 
single. In the case of wills, where the individual did not make a 
will, the status quo is distribution of the estate by the state’s 
rules of intestacy, and the default rule incorporates all the 
values embedded in those rules.135 
  
 131 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1181, 
1213 (2005) (discussing how rituals such as marriage can come to transform identities). 
 132 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 133 See Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1063, 
1132 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of a one-size-fits all organ transplantation 
regime, given the diversity of religious belief). 
 134 The concept of default rules is pervasive in the law. See, e.g., Adrienne 
Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (family law); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance 
Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 (2004) (inheritance 
law); Melanie B. Leslie, Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L. REV. 
67 (2005) (trust law); Nathalie Martin, Consumer Scams and the Elderly: Preserving 
Independence Through Shifting Default Rules, 17 ELDER L.J. 1 (2009) (elder law). 
 135 The status quo could also change. Intestacy rules could be altered so that 
all property escheats to the state upon death. The rule on withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment might specify that medical intervention will cease after $500,000 of public 
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Whatever the status quo outcome might be, a flat 
prohibition based on the personal nature of the decision 
obscures the decision being made—and its associated 
circumstances—from public inquiry. There is reason to be 
suspicious of this approach, or at least to interrogate the status 
quo outcomes in more depth. The personal nature of a decision 
or situation is typically invoked as part of an exercise in 
drawing a line between the public and private spheres, with 
the personal located on the private side of the line. This 
practice is not new, and the public-private distinction has a 
storied history in the law.136 Several scholars have vigorously 
attacked it, however, and for good reason. Legal realists point 
out that the public and private are interconnected, and thus 
many of the areas of law thought to be private in nature are in 
fact regulated by publicly promulgated rules.137 Feminist legal 
theorists emphasize that the distinction runs along gendered 
lines, and that the private sphere is the site of various 
injustices visited upon women, including domestic violence.138 
Prohibiting regulation of, or court involvement in, the private 
condones these injustices.139 
Further, we can actually identify concrete harms that 
might arise from a nondelegation rule. These dangers are most 
salient in the health-care domain. Health-care decisions 
represent exercises of capabilities to lead lives of length and 
  
monies have been spent on the ward. Marriage could require that the marriage 
contract be renegotiated every five years. 
 136 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982) (describing the historical evolution of 
the public/private distinction in legal thought). 
 137 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 
585-86 (1930) (noting how ostensibly private contractual law is actually regulated 
through public rules); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of Political 
and Economic Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 168-69 (1935) (noting that the 
government can induce private conduct through public policies such as taxation); 
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 484-85 (1909) (noting how 
ostensibly private contractual law is actually regulated through public rules). 
 138 See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED 100 (1989). 
 139 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
STATE 95 (1989) (“[S]ince a woman’s problems are not hers individually but those of 
women as a whole, they cannot be addressed except as a whole. In this analysis of 
gender as a nonnatural characteristic of a division of power in society, the personal 
becomes political.”); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33 
(1989) (analyzing the idea of separate spheres); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1563-70 (1983) 
(critiquing the dichotomy between family and market). For a summary of the different 
feminist critiques, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-43 (1992). 
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good health. Imagine the harm that could befall wards who are 
at the mercy of a prohibition on guardian decision-making in 
health-care affairs. This would favor the status quo of 
nontreatment (or existing treatment at the point of decisional 
incapacity). While this might be salutary in some circumstances 
(for instance, in preventing overmedication),140 more often it 
would have disastrous consequences if the ward suffered from a 
serious but treatable illness and was not already in a health-
care institution.141 
Thus, the argument fails on its own terms. If the 
damage is done simply by the decision being made by someone 
who did not initially possess the right of decision, then 
nondelegation fails to eliminate the harm. Nondelegation has 
merely shifted the decision to the status quo outcome created by 
the background legal framework. Indeed, it is more injurious to 
personhood to allow a decision to be made by an impersonal 
default rule, representing the majoritarian impulses of a given 
society, rather than by a guardian, who is likely a family 
member who knew the ward well and could express her wishes 
more faithfully. In other words, capabilities are meant to be 
individual expressions, not paternalistic defaults. 
Even if there is some damage to personhood, however 
conceived, the damage is minimized or eliminated by the fact 
that such personal delegations take place in the context of 
decisional incapacity. The individual lacking decisional capacity 
cannot make, or needs assistance in making, the decision 
herself, which requires that a surrogate assist in doing so.142 
Thus, personal delegations could actually be viewed as 
  
 140 See Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the 
Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1818, 1871-72 (1992) (“Wards are frequently relegated to institutional settings 
where they suffer from overmedication, physical restraints, and sensory deprivation for 
the convenience of the staff and for the sake of minimizing costs.”). 
 141 Of course, we can also identify concrete harms that could flow from 
nondelegation regimes in the areas of divorce and wills. For divorce, an abusive spouse could 
continue to dissipate marital assets (leaving the ward destitute), while in wills, 
inheritance could flow to an insolvent heir (frustrating the ward’s desire for her money 
to go to family members and not creditors). 
 142 See Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
271, 275 (1984) (“[T]o say that autonomy cannot be alienated is not to deny that one 
human being can be legitimately subject to the guardianship of another . . . . 
Individuals who altogether lack, or have lost, the relevant capacities are prime 
candidates for paternalistic intervention.”). In addition, delegations are revocable 
transfers of decision-making authority, though failure to reacquire decisional capacity 
makes them irrevocable for this set of individuals. 
2013] PERSONAL DELEGATIONS 1265 
 
promoting personhood, since they preserve the capabilities of 
the person lacking decisional capacity. 
III. LEGAL REFORM 
The proposal that flows from the analysis above is 
simple but broad in scope. If a decision implicates fundamental 
human capabilities and must be provided on an equal basis in 
order to be provided adequately to all, it should be delegable.143 
This proposal will almost certainly trouble those who are aware 
of high-profile instances of agent and guardian abuse.144 Such 
abuse undoubtedly exists and must be taken seriously, for in 
many cases it may threaten the fundamental human capabilities 
of those lacking decisional capacity. 
This issue is not new, however, and we must be on 
guard against instituting legal reforms on the basis of 
anecdotal horror stories, as emotionally compelling as they 
might be.145 While cases of abuse surely exist, we should not 
presume that a surrogate would make decisions that would be 
harmful to the ward’s interests in all, or even most, cases. As 
these are often weighty decisions, surrogate decision-makers—
  
 143 There may be cases in which permitting personal delegations for those 
with cognitive impairments threatens the capabilities of others who are similarly 
situated. See János Fiala-Butora, Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, The 
Democratic Life of the Union: Toward Equal Voting Participation for Europeans with 
Disabilities, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (noting this potential dynamic with 
respect to the delegation of voting). This important point reminds us that we must 
pursue a careful analysis of the theoretical and practical tradeoffs involved in 
constructing a personal delegations regime, particularly for different subgroups of 
individuals with cognitive impairments. In other words, there might be decisional 
domains in which personal delegations in practice do not achieve the normative goals 
for which they are put in place. 
 144 See, e.g., MERYL GORDON, MRS. ASTOR REGRETS (2008) (detailing the 
abuses Brooke Astor, wealthy philanthropist, suffered at the hands of her son during 
the final years of her life). 
 145 Lawrence Frolik put it particularly well: 
In the absence of “hard” data, both reformers and counter-reformers are free 
to rally support for their positions by pointing to horror stories of individual 
injustices. While emotionally compelling, these individual cases do not add up 
to a sound policy argument. No guardianship system will operate flawlessly 
and dispense justice to all at affordable prices. No particular outcome nor 
even a series of bad outcomes can automatically be interpreted as evidence of 
systemic problems. As with any system dependent on the actions, judgment, 
and discretion of numerous actors, the guardianship system will always fail 
some individuals. No matter how many reforms or counter-reforms are 
enacted, no matter how the system is modified, there is no perfection on this 
side of paradise. 
Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best Is the Enemy of the Good, 9 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 351 (1998).  
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who are often family members with interests that are aligned 
with their wards—would not take them lightly. In other words, 
there is no reason to believe that surrogates would necessarily 
divorce their wards or cut off life support on a whim. More 
importantly, these stories alone certainly do not compel us to 
disempower the class of individuals with cognitive 
impairment.146 
The essential question for the design of legal 
institutions is whether these types of decisions are relevantly 
different from those decisions already delegated, and thus, 
whether they require different institutions or legal rules to 
manage them. This part fleshes out how broader personal 
delegations would work in the context of durable powers of 
attorney and guardianship. It then provides a preliminary 
analysis of the areas of divorce, willmaking, and health care. 
A. Durable Powers of Attorney 
The background principle of agency law is that any 
lawful act may be delegated to another.147 Nevertheless, agency 
law has recognized an exception for a class of acts that require 
“personal performance” because of public policy, statute, or 
contract.148 While the requirement of personal performance of 
  
 146 It is, of course, an empirical question whether personal delegations would 
lead to widespread abuse or not. If it was demonstrated that surrogate decision-makers 
were consistently refusing to take personal decisions to allow their wards to actualize 
their capabilities, not respecting their wards’ wishes, or expressly harming their wards’ 
interests through the use of personal decision-making authority, this would call into 
question whether permitting personal delegations actually serves to promote the 
capabilities, dignity, and human flourishing of people with cognitive impairments. 
 147 See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80 (2d ed. 
1914) (“General rule—For any lawful purpose.—It is the general rule that an agency 
may be created for the performance of any lawful act, and that whatever a person may 
lawfully do, if acting in his own right and in his own behalf, he may lawfully delegate 
to an agent.”). 
 148 This exception has taken different forms, although the content has 
remained the same. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of Agency lists this exception 
under the heading “Capacity to Act as a Principal”: 
(3) If performance of an act is not delegable, its performance by an agent does 
not constitute performance by the principal. 
. . . . 
Comment: 
c. Delegability. A person may delegate performance of an act if its legal 
consequences for that person are the same whether the act is performed 
personally or by another. If personal performance is required, performance by 
an agent does not constitute performance by the principal. 
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contractual terms should not be disturbed, statutes and judicial 
interpretations of public policy should permit an individual to 
delegate personal decision-making authority to an agent (or co-
agents) in advance through a springing durable power of 
attorney.149 Such advance planning is desirable because the 
principal is in the best position to select a trustworthy agent 
who is knowledgeable about the principal’s beliefs and 
preferences. In addition, it will avoid the more cumbersome 
guardianship process, as a probate court will generally refuse 
to appoint a guardian if it appears that a ward’s needs are well-
served by an attorney-in-fact.150 
The current trend in crafting durable powers of attorney 
is to require that particular “hot powers” be specifically 
delegated in the instrument. Examples include the creation of a 
trust,151 revocation of a trust,152 changing a life insurance 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(3) & cmt. c (2006). Thus, the definition hinges 
on “personal performance,” which is left undefined, except by way of an example 
following the comment of a lawyer who is personally required to read certain 
documents. Older Restatements were more explicit about what constituted 
nondelegable acts. The first and second Restatements have identical language on this 
point: 
§ 17. What Acts are Delegable 
A person privileged, or subject to a duty, to perform an act or accomplish a 
result can properly appoint an agent to perform the act or accomplish the 
result, unless public policy or the agreement with another requires personal 
performance; if personal performance is required, the doing of the act by 
another on his behalf does not constitute performance by him. 
Comment: 
a. For most purposes, a person can properly create a power in an agent to 
achieve the same legal consequences by the performance of an act as if he 
himself had personally acted.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17 (1958); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 17 
(1933). 
 149 The springing condition is decisional incapacity, and the durable power of 
attorney would have to specify an acceptable method of such a determination, such as 
certification by a physician. The question of whether delegation should be permitted 
while an individual still has capacity is a question beyond the scope of this article. That 
being said, immediately effective durable powers of attorney have several advantages 
over the springing version. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to 
Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 19-23 (2007). 
 150 See McCallie v. McCallie, 660 So. 2d 584, 586-87 (Ala. 1995); In re Isadora 
R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (App. Div. 2004); In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. 1999). But 
see In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Blare, 589 N.W.2d 211, 214 (S.D. 1999). 
 151 See In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer, 895 A.2d 207, 211-12 (Vt. 2006). 
 152 See Muller v. Bank of Am., N.A., 12 P.3d 899, 904 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); 
First Union Nat’l Bank of Virginia v. Thomas, 37 Va. Cir. 35 (1995).  
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beneficiary designation,153 or gifting away property.154 These 
powers are considered “hot” because of their potential to alter 
an existing estate plan or dissipate the property of the estate.155 
The requirement that these powers be specifically delegated 
acts both to protect principals from the inadvertent granting of 
such powers but also to clarify that such powers are indeed 
delegable.156 To assist principals in determining which powers 
must be specifically delegated, one need only add to the list of 
powers that require specific delegation contained in the 
Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act.157 
The personal decisions at issue here could certainly be 
considered “hot,” although perhaps in a slightly different sense. 
They may in some circumstances have the ability to affect the 
principal’s estate plan, but they also have the potential to alter 
the principal’s life plan, changing significant objectives or 
social relationships that the ward had come to value. Given the 
importance of these personal decisions, it is imperative that an 
agent consult with the ward to discern whether there are any 
preferences she might express that would inform surrogate 
decision-making. Some commentators have suggested that this 
be required of all “fundamental transactions” that occur under 
a durable power of attorney, before or after the loss of 
decisional capacity, and this approach is consistent with the 
proposal here as well.158 
Most states give attorneys-in-fact wider berth than 
guardians, due to the fact that the principal has selected the 
agent in advance and specifically delegated controversial 
  
 153 See Weaver v. Deverell, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579, at *17-18 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 26, 2011).  
 154 See King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 612-13 (Md. 1985). 
 155 See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a 
Balance Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 348 (2008). 
 156 See id. 
 157 See UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER ATT’Y ACT § 1 (1988), 8b U.L.A. 191, 
201(a) (2001) (requiring specific delegation for the creation, revocation, amendment, or 
termination of a trust, making a gift, creating or changing a right of survivorship, 
creating or changing a beneficiary designation, authorizing another person to exercise 
authority granted to an agent, waiving the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint 
and survivor annuity, exercising fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to 
delegate, and disclaiming or refusing an interest in property). 
 158 See Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing Hidden 
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 42-51 (2006) (outlining 
such a proposal); see also Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): 
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 237-39 (2010) (discussing 
“representation agreements” in Canada, which have a similar flavor). 
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powers.159 Regardless of the specific regime a state might adopt for 
attorneys-in-fact as a whole, it is imperative that the nature of the 
fiduciary relationship be clear, so as to provide guidance to those 
agents and provide guidelines for evaluating potential abuse.160 
B. Guardianship 
1. Guardianship Regimes 
For those who have not planned in advance, the state 
should be permitted to delegate personal decision-making 
authority to a guardian. This system of expanded personal 
delegations should be accompanied by other reforms, however, 
to ensure that these delegations do not serve to aggrandize the 
power of guardians at the expense of wards. This is a real 
problem, especially because the United States relies too heavily 
on a plenary model of guardianship, where there is little 
tailoring of guardianship to specific decisional incapacities. This 
concern might be addressed, in part, by preserving (or explicitly 
adopting by statute) the current capacity requirement for many 
types of personal decisions, which is relatively low.161 Thus, an 
individual retains the capacity to make these decisions after 
losing other types of decisional capacity, and despite being 
placed under plenary guardianship.162 This protects the ward’s 
control over this important class of decisions, though it most 
  
 159 Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of 
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 42-48 (2001) (discussing reforms in various 
states, which range from requiring that a durable power of attorney be recorded to 
enabling third parties to police attorneys-in-fact in various ways). 
 160 See id.; Carolyn Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power 
of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 587 (1996) (calling for clarity on 
the attorney-in-fact’s duty to act). 
 161 While there are certainly cases in which it is clear that a person lacks 
capacity for a decision, there is often a large grey area as well. This is especially true 
for progressive conditions, in which a person’s capacity may vary day to day or for 
whom there may be periods of lucidity alternating with periods of clear incapacity. 
 162 See In re Estate of Romero, 126 P.3d 228, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (“The 
appointment of a conservator or guardian is not a determination of testamentary 
incapacity of the protected person.”); Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064, 1068-69 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (nullifying will while upholding marriage of senile man who 
married his housekeeper and then wrote a will a day later); In re Nelson, 891 S.W.2d 
181, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“The existence of a conservatorship does not necessarily 
preclude the capacity to make a will.”); see also Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, 
“Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 
2 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 303, 305 (2006) (“If legal capacity lies along a 
spectrum, testamentary capacity is at the lower end.”); Warren F. Gorman, 
Testamentary Capacity in Alzheimer’s Disease, 4 ELDER L.J. 225, 234-35 (1996) (noting 
that one may retain testamentary capacity in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease). 
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certainly does not eliminate the situations in which a ward has 
clearly lost decisional capacity and cannot make those decisions 
for herself. 
The other way to address this concern would be to shift 
to a guardianship system that is more supportive of ward 
decision-making and is less totalizing.163 Other countries, such 
as Sweden and Japan, have structured their guardianship 
systems to make the surrogate more of a mentor or assistant, 
rather than a substitute decision-maker.164 These approaches best 
safeguard the capabilities of those with cognitive impairments, as 
they try to facilitate choice in various life domains. 
Nevertheless, while this type of reform would be ideal, several 
intermediate and perhaps more attainable steps would still 
enhance the capabilities of people with disabilities under 
guardianship in the United States. There have been a host of 
proposals over the past thirty years, some of which have 
enjoyed modest success in various states. These include 
continuing to foster limited guardianships and defining 
incapacity in a domain-specific way (so as not to infringe on 
areas in which wards still retain decisional capacity),165 
instituting mediation techniques to adjudicate guardianship 
petitions (which may allow more flexible and creative solutions 
to problems of decisional incapacity within families),166 and 
restricting emergency guardianships.167 
2. Guarding the Guardians 
While guardianship reforms and increased personal 
delegations address the basic need to recognize the dignity of 
  
 163 See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to 
Guardianship?, 117 PENN. STATE L. REV. 1111, 1120-28 (2013) (proposing such a system). 
 164 See Stanley S. Herr, Self-Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for 
Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: 
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 431-35 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (describing the “god 
man,” who acts more as an assistant than a plenary guardian); Israel Doron, Elder 
Guardianship Kaleidoscope—A Comparative Perspective, 16 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 
368, 376 (2002) (describing the “hojonin,” or helper, for those who suffer from milder 
forms of intellectual disability, and with whom various decisions are jointly made with 
the ward). 
 165 See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a 
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 654-55 (1981). 
 166 See Mary F. Radford, Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult 
Guardianship Cases?, 31 STETSON L. REV. 611 (2002).  
 167 See Jamie L. Leary, Note, A Review of Two Recently Reformed 
Guardianship Statutes: Balancing the Need to Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect 
Themselves Against the Need to Guard Individual Autonomy, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
245, 259 (1997). 
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people with disabilities and facilitate their decisions, the 
following question still remains: what degree of oversight 
should govern the individuals or entities to whom personal 
decision-making authority is delegated? In other words, how do 
we guard the guardians? The guardian is the ward’s agent, 
subject to the requirements of fiduciary law as well as 
monitoring by the appointing court.168 She must file initial and 
annual reports about the ward, and she is subject to removal for 
mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty.169 Any interested 
person, including the ward, may petition the court for removal of 
the guardian or modification of the guardian’s powers.170 
This level of oversight represents the baseline, and it is 
not particularly stringent.171 The court can also require an 
additional layer of oversight—namely, by requiring that the 
guardian receive advance judicial approval for certain types of 
actions.172 This type of oversight is generally compulsory for 
“hot powers” in the financial realm whenever there is a high 
likelihood of decisional error. This risk of decisional error, 
combined with the importance of these decisions, justifies 
further oversight because of the potential harm to the ward. 
One way to recognize the potential risk of error is where a 
conflict of interest arises between the guardian and her ward. 
In fact, this is the operating principle for oversight in the law of 
trusts, where a trustee must secure advance judicial approval 
  
 168 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Is the Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?, 37 
STETSON L. REV. 53, 85-86 (2007) (noting that the guardians, statutory surrogates, and 
agents acting under a durable power of attorney have the same responsibilities and 
fiduciary requirements). 
 169 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22 (West 2012) (requiring the filing of an 
initial report within 60 days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (2011) (requiring an 
annual report). These reports are generally read by judges, court staff, or outside 
experts, though sometimes they are not read at all due to poor funding of the 
guardianship system. See Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability 
Then and Now: Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 904-
11 (2002). 
 170 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-307(1) (West 2012) (“On petition of the 
ward or any person interested in the ward’s welfare, the court may remove a guardian 
and appoint a successor if in the best interests of the ward.”). However, many states 
have still not implemented standards for guardian conduct and ethics, and many that 
have do not apply these standards to family guardians, making it difficult to know or 
punish breaches of fiduciary duty. See generally Karen E. Boxx & Terry W. Hammond, 
A Call for Standards: An Overview of the Current Status and Need for Guardian 
Standards of Conduct and Codes of Ethics, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1207 (2012).  
 171 But see Hurme & Wood, supra note 169, at 901 (arguing that the 
requirement of filling out reports can have a “sentinel effect” by making guardians 
aware that the court will hold them accountable). 
 172 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3725 (West 2012) (outlining the procedure 
for authorization of “extraordinary authority”). 
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to engage in a conflicted transaction.173 The presence of a 
conflict of interest is concerning because it suggests that the 
decision being made could harm the ward. That is, the 
decisions will represent the interests of the surrogate decision-
maker rather than the ward, which may be problematic 
because it ignores the past preferences or present interests of 
the ward. Thus, the presence of a conflict serves as a red flag 
that a bad decision might be coming down the pipeline.174  
In one sense, family guardians making surrogate 
decisions are likely to be free from serious conflicts. Familial 
ties will often (although not always) create an alignment of 
interests between the family guardian and the ward. In other 
words, the family guardian will benefit psychologically when the 
ward’s known preferences are satisfied or when the ward is 
doing well. At the same time, family guardians may find 
themselves in conflicted positions. For example, their financial 
position may change through the exercise of a personal decision 
that impacts how the ward’s resources will be distributed at 
death. Similarly, family guardians are also caregivers and may 
view their duties as imposing a cost more than bestowing a 
benefit. As a result, they may exercise personal decision-
making authority to minimize their care duties rather than 
implement the ward’s preferences or safeguard the ward’s 
interests. Finally, family guardians may have preexisting 
opinions or resentments about the ward’s personal decisions 
about her body, identity, or intimate associations, and they 
may wish to reverse those decisions if given the power to do so. 
On the other hand, professional guardians are unlikely to be 
conflicted in the same way, although they may have incentives 
to make personal decisions in a manner that maximizes profits 
or implements their social missions. The presence of these 
incentives may also put them at odds with the ward’s 
preferences or interests. 
A standard conflict-of-interest analysis may not capture 
the entire universe of decisions that should be subject to 
  
 173 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole 
Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 965-67 (2005) (explaining how the judicial 
approval mechanism derives from the equitable “petition for instructions”). 
 174 The presence of a conflict does not necessarily mean that a particular 
decision-maker should be disqualified or is a poor choice for the job. See Adrian 
Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L. J. 
384, 389-90 (2012) (arguing that conflicts of interest should not immediately foreclose 
delegation of decision-making authority and must be balanced against the benefits of 
delegating to that particular entity). 
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judicial review in a personal delegations regime. This stems 
from the fact that conflicts are more likely to take nonpecuniary 
forms in the context of surrogate decision-making on personal 
matters. Thus, they are harder to detect and regulate. Courts 
should try to detect these hidden conflicts by examining the 
exercise of decision-making authority under the substituted 
judgment or best interests standards. For example, a 
surrogate’s decision may imply a preference for an outcome 
that is unlikely to have been held by the ward because a strong 
consensus favors a status quo outcome in a wide range of likely 
circumstances.175 Under substituted judgment, this should be a 
red flag that a hidden conflict of interest might be at work. In 
other words, because it is highly unlikely that a ward would 
have exercised decision-making authority in the same way 
herself, the surrogate’s exercise of authority is suspect. 
Alternatively, under a best interests analysis, a court should 
suspect the exercise of personal decision-making authority by a 
surrogate when there are few situations one can imagine in which 
taking such a decision would advance the ward’s interests. 
Consider the decision to marry. In normal 
circumstances, most wards probably would not wish for their 
guardians to marry them off to someone while they lacked 
capacity. Assuming that marriage is more of an individual as 
opposed to a familial or cultural choice, it is difficult to imagine 
circumstances in which it would advance the objective interests 
  
 175 The range of likely circumstances must include possible changed 
circumstances, which can take many forms. Something might change in the ward’s 
immediate situation that might lead to a need for a decision to be made. This is 
clearest in the health-care arena, as it is difficult to predict one’s health status in 
advance, given unknown genetics and environmental factors. See Einer Elhauge, 
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1479 (1994) (“[I]n contrast to 
other needs, the need for health care is unpredictable.”). Something might change 
about the situations of persons for whom the ward cared or would care that could be 
considered under an expanded best interests analysis. In fact, this is the type of 
situation that birthed the substituted judgment doctrine. Ex parte Whitbread involved 
a wealthy but decisionally incapable man, and his niece who requested some portion of 
his estate to which she was not legally entitled. [1816] 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.) 878-79. 
The Chancellor decided to give her some portion of the estate, reasoning that the man 
would not have wanted his relations to be beggars and bring disrepute to his family. 
See id. at 879-80; see also Harmon, supra note 108, at 19. Finally, something might 
change about the context in which the ward operates that would create a desire to 
make a decision in a given personal domain. A state legislature or Congress may alter 
one of the default rules in a decisional domain, or the legal effect of a preexisting 
decision. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 633, 712-24 (2004) (describing the debates over means-tested public benefits 
programs, which often lead to changes in eligibility criteria). Alternatively, a 
technological change may alter the option set for wards, which is a common occurrence 
in the health-care arena. 
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of a ward to marry another person. Thus, the court should 
review this exercise of surrogate decision-making authority 
with suspicion, although there may be scenarios where a 
surrogate’s exercise of the right to marry would be justified.176  
While conflicts of interest or suspect exercises of 
decision-making authority call for judicial review, the question 
whether courts have the institutional competence to review 
such decisions remains.177 For financial transactions that 
require advance judicial approval, the court has some ability to 
sort through the evidence to determine whether an action is 
appropriate. For instance, a judge is fully competent to 
determine whether giving gifts out of the estate is consistent 
with practices before incapacity or if it will have positive 
benefits from a tax law perspective. The same is not necessarily 
true of many of these personal decisions, since the preferences 
underlying them may be idiosyncratic or unrevealed, and the 
objective interests of the ward may be difficult to ascertain. 
This is not to say that courts lack all evaluative capacity, but it 
does suggest that a more deferential posture might be 
appropriate when evaluating petitions for advance judicial 
approval of most types of personal decision-making.178 
  
 176 For example, an individual who is on the way to her wedding might suffer 
an accident. It is quite possible that such a ward would desire her incapacitated self to 
be married off by her guardian to her intended spouse, if the spouse was still willing. 
Thus, the decision to marry, even taken by a surrogate, would be justified under a 
substituted judgment approach. It may even be justifiable under a broader best interests 
test. See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 105, at 1512 (describing how an expanded best 
interests model “may include consideration of consequences for significant others if a 
reasonable person might ordinarily consider such consequences.”). In this type of 
analysis, it would be appropriate to take into account the spouse-to-be’s interests in 
fulfilling the promise of marriage. Another scenario might involve a same-sex couple 
that desired to get married but did not live in a state that allowed same-sex marriage 
until one member of the couple lacked decisional capacity. Having a guardian authorize 
such a marriage would be justified using the same reasoning described above. The 
factual circumstances that would justify the exercise of marital decision-making 
authority are certainly rare though. Not many people suffer from accidents on their 
wedding day or become cognitively impaired before they acquire the right to marry. 
 177 The institutional competence literature traditionally compares courts to 
other governmental institutions, such as administrative agencies or the elected 
branches. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A 
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest 
Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941 (1999); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of 
Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296 (1993). The comparator here is different—a 
surrogate decision-maker who is usually a family member—but such a surrogate may 
have distinct advantages over judges in knowledge of the ward’s preferences and the 
ward’s current situation. 
 178 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 53-54 (2007) (discussing deference in the 
context of agency action and inaction); Kathryn Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing 
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C. Preliminary Applications 
This subpart will examine personal delegations in the 
three illustrative areas discussed earlier. The aim is to 
establish a process for evaluating different decisional domains 
and sketch out the contours of personal delegations regimes in 
the domains of divorce, wills, and health care in particular. 
The first step in assessing a decisional domain is to 
evaluate whether the decision falls into the set of those deemed 
personal by the particular normative theory being applied. This 
article employs the capabilities approach as its primary 
normative theory, and the three decisions at issue are connected 
to fundamental human capabilities.179 The second step is to 
evaluate which delegation mechanisms would be appropriate 
and, specifically, whether the mechanism of statutory surrogacy 
is warranted because emergency decisions must be made. The 
third step is to evaluate the likelihood that conflicts will arise for 
common decision-makers in each domain, who will most often be 
family members although increasingly may be nonprofit, 
private, or public guardians. Finally, one must take into 
account any special features of the domain that might impact 
the analysis. 
1. Divorce 
While there are certainly harms that might be 
associated with continuing marriage, they are not necessarily 
of a type that would require an emergency divorce. This is 
because several legal mechanisms exist to deal with the most 
harmful of abusive situations, at least on a temporary basis.180 
Thus, statutory surrogacy is unnecessary in the divorce 
domain, as surrogate decision-making can be handled through 
durable powers of attorney and guardianship. 
  
Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583 (2011) (same). Another way of preventing abuse would be to 
change the burden of proof for the surrogate decision-maker who desired to make a 
personal decision for the ward. As noted earlier, this has been the strategy in some 
states with regard to withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 179 See generally supra Part I.B. It is likely that all three decisions would be 
considered personal under a substituted judgment approach, but the best interests 
approach might encompass a narrower range of personal decisions, depending on the 
theory of welfare used. 
 180 See generally Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of 
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of civil protection orders to prevent 
domestic violence). 
1276 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
An advance delegation through a durable power of 
attorney should specifically authorize the divorce decision as 
well as the ability to self-deal. Surrogates may benefit from a 
divorce action, especially if they are adult children who would 
be entitled to a larger inheritance if their parents were 
divorced. On the other hand, if no conflicts are present, judicial 
approval is likely unnecessary since various factual situations 
might justify divorce, such as abuse or the need to segregate 
assets in order to qualify for certain public benefits programs.181 
These circumstances sometimes lead individuals with 
decisional capacity to seek a strategic “Medicaid divorce” to 
separate assets from their spouse and establish eligibility for 
Medicaid or other public assistance programs.182 Moreover, 
advance judicial approval is superfluous because a divorce 
action already takes place within the context of a legal 
proceeding, where the other party most affected by the divorce 
decision—namely, the spouse—is already involved. As such, 
the spouse will be on notice and can raise arguments about the 
guardian’s impropriety with the probate court if necessary. 
2. Wills 
As with divorce, there is likely no situation that would 
require an emergency willmaking, so delegation should be 
permitted only in advance by durable power of attorney or 
through guardianship after decisional incapacity strikes. If a 
durable power of attorney specifically granted the power to craft 
a will and permitted self-dealing with respect to willmaking, 
then no advance judicial approval should be required. 
Guardianship, however, presents a different scenario. 
Many family guardians will have conflicts of interest by virtue 
  
 181 For example, consider Medicaid, which funds a substantial amount of the 
country’s long-term health care. See LAURA SUMMER, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM 
CARE FIN. PROJECT, MEDICAID & LONG-TERM CARE (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/medicaid2006.pdf. As a means-tested program, Medicaid 
takes account of an individual’s income and assets to see if they qualify for assistance. 
Id. As recently as 2005, Congress changed the eligibility criteria for Medicaid, making 
its provisions more stringent for those who gave away assets in order to qualify. See 
Monica J. Franklin, How the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Affects Medicaid Recipients, 
42 TENN. B.J., May 2006, at 18-19 (describing how the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
increased the Medicaid look-back period for gift-giving to sixty months). 
 182 See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1453, 1457-58 (2004) (describing the phenomenon of Medicaid 
divorce as a strategic choice for managing caregiving burdens); Hal Fliegelman & 
Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to Do Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 341, 359-61, 364 (1997) (same). 
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of their status as potential heirs, suggesting that advance 
judicial approval should be required. Despite this, a guardian’s 
exercise of willmaking authority is not inherently suspect 
because a nontrivial number of testators may have preferences 
for disposition of assets that vary from the intestacy rules, and 
certain circumstances may warrant willmaking for estate 
planning purposes. Moreover, the court likely possesses 
sufficient competence to review evidence of the ward’s prior 
wishes and assess the tax or other legal advantages to crafting 
a will. Accordingly, no particular deference is owed to the 
guardian decision-maker. 
Delegation of authority in the willmaking context would 
also have the benefit of harmonizing the peculiar situation that 
currently exists within trusts and estates law, where wills and 
will substitutes are treated differently for purposes of 
delegation despite being functionally identical. Indeed, the 
creation of a trust arguably has a more immediate effect on an 
estate, since it transfers assets from the probate estate during 
the ward’s lifetime, whereas the will’s power is only exercised 
at the death of the ward. If guardians have access to the former 
tool, then providing access to the latter for estate planning 
purposes would not mark a revolutionary change. 
3. Health Care 
Health care is a broad domain that encompasses a wide 
variety of decisions regarding medical care and treatment. 
Medical emergencies are common enough that this domain 
requires a mechanism for the clear and rapid designation of a 
surrogate decision-maker. This feature explains and justifies 
why surrogacy statutes arose in the health-care domain, 
although these statutes can also be complemented by other 
legal delegation mechanisms, such as the health-care power of 
attorney or guardianship. 
For most of the decisions in this domain, family 
guardians are unlikely to be conflicted because they lack 
incentives to restrict ward treatment and likely wish to extend 
the life and health of the ward. There is also nothing inherently 
suspect about the exercise of decision-making authority in this 
domain, since most wards would actually prefer treatment to 
nontreatment. Conflicts may arise, however, in the case of life-
or-death decisions, since death triggers a series of legal 
consequences, such as inheritance. Normally, this would imply 
that advance judicial approval should be required for these 
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decisions. The health-care domain is unique, however, in that 
the decisions that compose it are already subject to oversight by 
the medical profession. It is therefore unclear that adding an 
additional layer of judicial review would add anything except 
additional process. On the other hand, if there is reason to 
believe that the medical profession is insufficiently protective 
of the ward’s capabilities for certain decisions, then judicial 
intervention may be appropriate. In addition, if there is a 
conflict among family members, or if members of the medical 
profession request judicial intervention, then the court should 
adjudicate the matter, with proper deference to the designated 
decision-maker. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of us will have personal experience with 
decisional incapacity during our lifetime, either by acquiring 
cognitive impairments as we age or serving as a surrogate for 
someone who needs assistance. These abilities to receive and 
provides care are currently inhibited by legal doctrines that 
sever people with cognitive impairments from decisions that 
inhere in their fundamental human capabilities. This article 
has critiqued the use of the concept of the personal to justify a 
nondelegation rule in the case of decisional incapacity. 
Personal delegations should be permitted through private or 
public mechanisms, accompanied by reforms of guardianship 
and judicial review in cases where conflicts of interest are 
present or the exercise of decision-making authority is 
inherently suspect. These issues cannot be avoided or ignored, 
and our institutional legal structures must adapt to the socio-
legal changes inherent in personal delegations law. 
